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A Derivative in Need
RESCUING U.S. SECURITY-BASED SWAPS FROM
THE RACE TO THE BOTTOM
“Derivatives in and of themselves are not evil. There’s
nothing evil about how they’re traded, how they’re accounted
for, and how they’re financed, like any other financial
instrument, if done properly.”1
INTRODUCTION
Ever since the 2007–2008 global financial crisis, the term
“derivative” has become somewhat of a dirty word—at least in the
financial context.2 This stigma resulted from a combination of
general misunderstanding and widespread confusion as to the
actual mechanics of some derivatives,3 mixed with the blame that
policymakers placed on over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives4 for
inciting and contributing to the crisis.5 The reality, however, is

1 Vince Veneziani, Q&A With Jim Chanos Part I: “Greece Is A Prelude,” BUS.
INSIDER (Apr. 13, 2010, 9:36 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/interview-with-jimchanos-on-dubai-greece-derivatives-2010-4 [http://perma.cc/3UXA-XRZD]. Jim Chanos
is president of the Manhattan-based hedge fund called Kynikos Associates and has
made a name for himself by correctly betting on the decline of major companies,
including Tyco, Worldcom, and Enron. Id.
2 Henry
Tricks,
Dirty
Words,
ECONOMIST
(Nov.
19,
2008),
http://www.economist.com/node/12494685 [http://perma.cc/S3P9-TM4E]; see also David
Ott, Dirty Words of Finance, ACROPOLIS INV. MGMT. (Oct. 13, 2014), http://acrinv.com/
dirty-words-of-finance/ [http://perma.cc/DL3Z-XH9R] (comparing the term “derivative”
to George Carlin’s list of “‘seven dirty words’ that [are] unsuitable for television”).
3 “When [they think of] ‘derivatives,’ most people are lucky if they can
conjure up anything but an indistinct fog.” Andrew Beattie, The Barnyard Basics of
Derivatives, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/articles/basics/07/derivatives_
basics.asp [http://perma.cc/A5R4-VD39] (last visited Nov. 30, 2015); see also Thomas J.
Molony, Still Floating: Security-Based Swap Agreements After Dodd-Frank, 42 SETON
HALL L. REV. 953, 953 (2012) (noting the confusion that exists as to the meaning and
scope of the term “security-based swap agreement”).
4 See infra Sections I.A, I.D for a detailed history and explanation of
OTC derivatives.
5 Erik F. Gerding, Credit Derivatives, Leverage, and Financial Regulation’s
Missing Macroeconomic Dimension, 8 BERKLEY BUS. L.J. 29, 30 (2011); see also Kristin
N. Johnson, Things Fall Apart: Regulating the Credit Default Swap Commons, 82 U.
COLO. L. REV. 167, 205-15 (2011) (explaining the risks of credit derivatives and how
they contributed to the financial crisis).
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that “[t]his opprobrium is entirely undeserved.”6 In fact, some
derivatives have the singular ability to provide investors with
exposure to difficult-to-reach markets, hedging protection, and
speculation opportunities.7 One such product in this family is
known as the security-based swap.8
The security-based swap is, in the most simplified
terms, a financial instrument that allows investors to manage
risk.9 Its core utility stems from its unique structure, which
allows investors to capture the gains and losses of an equity (or
an index) without purchasing the stock itself.10 These swaps
often reference securities in a jurisdiction foreign to that of the
investor and thus are sometimes referred to as “cross-border
security-based swaps.” In general, the importance of securitybased swaps to the global financial system cannot be denied, as
they (along with a related class of derivatives known as forwards)
represent roughly $2.5 trillion worth of the outstanding amount of
all OTC contracts worldwide—a staggering $630.1 trillion—as of
December 2014.11 As a result of this popularity, the U.S. judicial
and legislative branches have taken steps to increase the scrutiny
directed toward security-based swaps in an effort to prevent and
combat securities fraud, the likes of which could cause investors
and markets significant harm.
Despite efforts to clarify the U.S. approach to regulating
OTC derivatives, the landscape of securities fraud policies
governing security-based swaps continues to fluctuate.12 In the
6 JOHN J. STEPHENS, MANAGING CURRENCY RISK: USING FINANCIAL
DERIVATIVES 10 (2001).
7 See infra Sections I.B, I.C. In this note, the term “hedging” refers to the act
of protecting one’s existing trades against unexpected and unfavorable market
movements (a defensive strategy), while “speculation” refers to the act of placing new
trades based on predictions of future market movements in order to profit (an offensive
strategy). See Hedge, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/h/hedge.asp
[http://perma.cc/JKD8-GZW5] (last visited Nov. 30, 2015); Speculation, INVESTOPEDIA,
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/s/speculation.asp [http://perma.cc/MRH7-ALLL] (last
visited Nov. 30, 2015).
8 This derivative is referred to by a variety of names, including “securitybased swap” (15 U.S.C. § 78c-1(b) (2012)), “securities-based swap” (15 U.S.C. § 78j(b)
(2012)), and “equity swap” (7 U.S.C. § 1a(47)(A)(iii)(XI) (2012)). This note will generally
use the term “security-based swap.” All swaps—including security-based swaps—are
derivatives, but not all derivatives are swaps. See infra Section I.A.
9 See Derivative, I NVESTOPEDIA , http://www.investopedia.com/terms/d/
derivative.asp [http://perma.cc/23VG-KD5U] (last visited Nov. 30, 2015).
10 See infra Section I.C.
11 BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, BIS DERIVATIVES STATISTICS tbl.19 (2014),
http://www.bis.org/statistics/dt1920a.pdf [http://perma.cc/7HP4-X6X4] [hereinafter BIS
TABLE 19].
12 For a narrative on recent changes to private rights of action and SECinitiated litigation, see Mark A. Kornfeld, Tracking New Developments in Securities
Litigation, in NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN SECURITIES LITIGATION (2014).
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judicial arena, courts have struggled to pin down a clear and
concise standard to use when determining whether to apply U.S.
securities fraud laws in cases involving cross-border securitybased swaps. The difficulty stems from a principle referred to as
“the presumption against extraterritoriality,” which establishes
courts’ reluctance to apply U.S. laws to foreign conduct without
an express congressional directive to do so and reflects U.S.
courts’ fear of impairing international comity.13
Based on the presumption against extraterritoriality, in
2010, the Supreme Court held in Morrison v. National Australia
Bank Ltd. that in the cross-border derivative context, privately
raised securities fraud claims should be examined under a new
“transactional test,” which focuses on the location of the
transaction and the parties to it.14 Though this test purports to
establish a bright-line rule, subsequent cases have quickly exposed
its inherent ambiguity, sending courts freewheeling into uncharted
territory as they attempt to refine it. The most recent effort to
interpret Morrison as it applies to cross-border derivatives was the
Second Circuit’s August 2014 decision in Parkcentral Global Hub
Ltd. v. Porsche Automobile Holdings SE.15
The Parkcentral decision, which focused on cross-border
security-based swaps, added a new layer to Morrison’s
transactional test by mandating that the parties’ domestic location
be viewed as a necessary—but not on its own sufficient—factor to
authorize the application of U.S. securities fraud laws in cases
where the alleged fraudulent conduct occurred in a foreign
jurisdiction.16 Only an individualized factual analysis can now
establish sufficient cause to invoke U.S. securities laws.17
Problematically, the court in Parkcentral did not express an
opinion about the novel test utilized by the district court, which
ignored the Supreme Court’s emphasis on the location of the
parties and focused instead on the “economic reality” of the
transaction.18 The district court’s economic reality test effectively
prohibits U.S. parties to cross-border security-based swap
transactions from litigating actions of securities fraud within the
United States. Without domestic recourse, U.S. parties have
See infra Section I.D.
Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 269-70 (2010).
15 Parkcentral Glob. Hub Ltd. v. Porsche Auto. Holdings SE, 763 F.3d 198
(2d Cir. 2014).
16 Id. at 214.
17 Id. at 217.
18 Elliott Assocs. v. Porsche Auto. Holding SE, 759 F. Supp. 2d 469, 476
(S.D.N.Y. 2010), aff’d sub nom. Parkcentral Glob. Hub Ltd. v. Porsche Auto. Holdings
SE, 763 F.3d 198 (2d Cir. 2014).
13
14
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become attractive targets for foreign perpetrators of securities
fraud. The Second Circuit’s failure to expose this flaw and
expressly reject the economic reality test preserves the test’s
viability for future cases, which in turn risks decisions that are
not consistent with Morrison.
Meanwhile, Congress has intensified its regulation of
derivatives through the Dodd-Frank Act.19 This legislation, enacted
in response to the 2007–2008 financial crisis, was designed in part
to reduce systemic risk and increase transparency in OTC
markets.20 The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC),
as part of its responsibilities under Dodd-Frank, issued
interpretive guidance to clarify the scope of some of Dodd-Frank’s
security-based-swap-related policies. This included refining the
definition of a “U.S. person,” which determines what parties will
be subject to Dodd-Frank’s requirements.21 Notably, some foreign
subsidiaries of U.S. companies are not included in this definition
merely because of their connection to their U.S. parent.22 This
approach differs from the policies of foreign nations and encourages
U.S. investors to transfer investments abroad in order to avoid the
cost of compliance with Dodd-Frank.23
The combined effect of the Parkcentral decision and the
SEC’s interpretive guidance has been to encourage security-based
swap investors to shift investments away from U.S. markets and
into foreign jurisdictions. Between the cost of compliance with
Dodd-Frank and the lack of domestic protection against securities
fraud in U.S. courts, these U.S. investors are incentivized to “race
to the bottom” and seek deregulated, lower cost, foreign
jurisdictions in which to conduct trades. This embeds riskincreasing “regulatory arbitrage” in the global OTC derivative
system and threatens to foster the systemic risk that Dodd-Frank
was designed to minimize.24
This note argues that the confluence of judicial and
legislative measures taken to regulate derivatives will transform
19 Investor Protection and Securities Reform Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111203, 124 Stat. 1822 (codified as amended in separate sections of 15 U.S.C.).
20 CHATHAM FIN., THE END-USER GUIDES TO DERIVATIVES REGULATION: OVERVIEW
OF TITLE VII OF THE DODD-FRANK ACT 1 (2012), http://www.chathamfinancial.com/wpcontent/uploads/2012/08/Chatham-Financial-Overview-of-Title-VII-of-the-Dodd-FrankAct.pdf [http://perma.cc/FDZ2-9XA7].
21 Application of “Sec.-Based Swap Dealer” & “Major Sec.-Based Swap
Participant” Definitions to Cross-Border Sec.-Based Swap Activities; Republican, 79
Fed. Reg. 47,278, 47,303-13 (Aug. 12, 2014) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. 240, 241, 250)
[hereinafter The August Publication].
22 Id. at 47,308.
23 See infra Sections II.B.3.ii, III.C.
24 See infra Section II.B.3.
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the otherwise strong U.S. OTC derivatives market into an
unattractive environment that is especially hostile to U.S. parties
in cross-border security-based swap agreements. Therefore, in
order to recapture investment by making the regulatory
landscape in the United States more hospitable to security-based
swap investors while still maintaining the newly minted
safeguards against systemic risk, this note advocates for a twopronged solution. First, there must be a conclusive dismissal of
the economic reality test, and second, there must be global
cooperation and consistency in regulating OTC security-based
swap markets.
Part I of this note describes the history of derivatives and
significance of the “over-the-counter” classification. It explains
the workings of security-based swaps, their utility as a
derivative, and the Dodd-Frank reforms enacted to increase
supervision of their trading.
Part II focuses on the U.S. security-based swap market’s
impending contraction and its possible implications. This Part
begins by analyzing the private-sector hostility towards crossborder security-based swaps, first by describing the state of the
law that led to the Parkcentral decision and then by examining
the decision itself, with an emphasis on its failure to address
the economic reality test. This Part then analyzes the public
sector’s narrowing of the security-based swap market by
focusing on the negative economic impact and potential
regulatory arbitrage promoted by the SEC’s definition of a U.S.
person. Part II concludes by synthesizing the private and
public sector issues to illustrate the damaging effect they will
have on the U.S. market for security-based swaps: an
unfriendly environment for domestic investors that leaves room
for them to shift their investment abroad.
Finally, Part III advocates for a two-pronged solution. First,
it proposes eliminating the economic reality test as a standard for
determining the applicability of U.S. securities fraud laws. Second,
it calls for a coordinated global effort to manage systemic risk in
OTC markets to thereby eliminate a risk-preserving race to the
bottom. Together, these measures can attract increased investment
in the U.S. market for security-based swaps while properly
protecting those who invest in it.
I.

UNDERSTANDING SECURITY-BASED SWAPS

To fully comprehend the regulatory environment that
controls cross-border security-based swaps, it is important to
first understand the swaps’ genesis, the mechanics of the swap
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agreement itself, the economic benefits that swaps generate,
and the size of the swap market.
A.

History of OTC Derivatives and Swaps

Just like forwards, futures, and options,25 a swap is a
financial instrument known as a derivative, which is defined as
“a financial contract whose value depends on the values of one or
more underlying assets or indexes of asset values.”26 Simply put,
the central focus of a derivative is on allocating risk, because the
underlying reference asset27 of the derivative controls the
contract’s value;28 the type of asset that is referenced and its
relation to an investor’s other assets can alter the investor’s
overall risk profile. Derivatives first became popular in 1848,
when the Chicago Board of Trade began offering forwards, also
known as “to arrive” contracts, on grain.29 And despite the bad
reputation the word “derivative” may have developed following
the 2007–2008 financial crisis,30 financial derivatives have
always played an important role in commerce.
Swaps have roots that reach back to 1981.31 In that
year, International Business Machines Corporation (IBM)
sought to take advantage of an increasingly strong U.S. dollar.
Meanwhile, the World Bank wanted “to borrow in Swiss francs
and West German marks,” but it could not do so on its own.32
Although the full details of the transaction were never
published, the core of the agreement was for the World Bank to
provide U.S. dollar interest payments to IBM in exchange for
25 Similar to swaps, these instruments are also derivatives that can be used
to hedge risk or speculate. See Derivative, supra note 9. The details of these derivatives
fall beyond the scope of this note; simply recall that the term “derivative” is a broad
categorization that includes multiple financial instruments, including swaps. See supra
text accompanying note 8.
26 Christian Johnson, Regulatory Arbitrage, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction, and
Dodd-Frank: The Implications of US Global OTC Derivative Regulation, 14 NEV. L.J.
542, 547 (2014).
27 A “reference asset can be infinitely many things—an interest rate or
exchange rate, an index of bonds or mortgage-backed securities (MBS), commodity prices,
or the weather.” Sean J. Griffith, Substituted Compliance and Systemic Risk: How to
Make a Global Market in Derivatives Regulation, 98 MINN. L. REV. 1291, 1295 (2014).
28 Id.
29 History of the CFTC: US Futures Trading and Regulation Before the
Creation of the CFTC, U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION,
http://www.cftc.gov/About/HistoryoftheCFTC/history_precftc
[http://perma.cc/8JB7BUBH] (last visited Nov. 30, 2015).
30 See Tricks, supra note 2.
31 Reuters, I.B.M. in Deal on Currency, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 18, 1981),
http://www.nytimes.com/1981/08/18/business/ibm-in-deal-on-currency.html [http://perma.cc/
5UQ4-WQAU].
32 Id.
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assuming IBM’s franc- and mark-denominated debt, thereby
giving birth to the first interest rate swap.33
As swaps joined the global family of financial
instruments, the agreements were divided between exchangetraded and OTC derivatives—common classifications for financial
instruments.34
Exchange-traded
derivatives
involve
an
intermediary (a clearinghouse or the exchange itself), are
highly standardized, and consequently restrict customization of
their features, such as underlying assets or maturity dates.35
By contrast, OTC derivatives are negotiated privately, without
an intermediary.36 This affords opposing parties to the deal
(counterparties) limitless possibilities37 when negotiating the
terms of their contract.38
According to the Bank for International Settlements’
semiannual statistical analysis, as of December 2014, the
outstanding notional amount39 of all OTC derivatives worldwide
was approximately $630.1 trillion, with a gross market value of
$20.9 trillion.40 The astounding magnitude of this global market
makes it an arena that cannot be ignored from a regulatory
perspective, and as scrutiny of OTC markets has increased, the
swap derivative has become the “principal focus of regulatory
attention since the [2007–2008] crisis.”41 As Gary Gensler,
former chairman of the Commodity Futures Trading
Commission (CFTC), asserted, “[t]hough there were many
causes to the crisis in 2008, it is evident that [OTC]
swaps . . . played a central role.”42 Even some members of the
upper echelon of professional investing have recognized
derivatives’ latent risks and avoided trading them altogether.43
Those fears notwithstanding, the 4.84% increase in the total
Id.
Griffith, supra note 27, at 1297.
35 Id.
36 Id. at 1298.
37 For further description of OTC derivatives’ customization, see Norman
Menachem Feder, Deconstructing Over-the-Counter Derivatives, 2002 COLUM. BUS. L.
REV. 677, 735 (2002) (noting that “OTC derivatives . . . are made-to-order” and “[i]t is
difficult to overestimate the power and value of customized derivatives”).
38 Griffith, supra note 27, at 1298.
39 Notional amounts are described infra note 46.
40 BIS TABLE 19, supra note 11 (corresponding with a $612 billion gross
market value for the worldwide total amount of equity-linked specific contracts).
41 Griffith, supra note 27, at 1298.
42 Gary Gensler, Chairman, U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n,
Remarks before the London School of Economics (Oct. 13, 2011), http://www.cftc.gov/
PressRoom/SpeechesTestimony/opagensler-93 [http://perma.cc/9J6M-FFL6].
43 WARREN E. BUFFETT, BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC. 2002 ANNUAL REPORT 15
(2003), http://www.berkshirehathaway.com/2002ar/2002ar.pdf [http://perma.cc/W5QEHTD4] (characterizing derivatives as “financial weapons of mass destruction”).
33
34
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outstanding notional amount of all OTC derivatives contracts
from December 2010 to December 2014 may suggest that the
majority of investors deem the benefits of derivatives to
outweigh the risks.44
B.

Anatomy of a Security-Based Swap

The structure of security-based swaps is the key to their
unique and crucial utility in the cross-border context. In
essence, any general swap transaction is an agreement
between two parties “to exchange cash flows over a specified
period of time.”45 This is best exemplified by the simplest and
most common type of swap, known as a “plain vanilla” interest
rate swap, which occurs when
Party A agrees to pay Party B a predetermined, fixed rate of interest
on a notional principal on specific dates for a specified period of time.
Concurrently, Party B agrees to make payments based on a floating
interest rate to Party A on that same notional principal on the same
specified dates for the same specified time period.46

In these agreements, the floating rate of interest is frequently
based on a benchmark, such as the London Interbank Offered
Rate (LIBOR).47
These same principles apply to security-based swaps, but
there, “at least one party’s payments . . . [are] based on the return
44 Compare BIS TABLE 19, supra note 11 (listing the notional value for December
2014), with BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, STATISTICAL RELEASE: OTC DERIVATIVES
STATISTICS AT END-JUNE 2012, at 14 (Nov. 2014), http://www.bis.org/publ/otc_hy1211.pdf
[http://perma.cc/3VV3-KFWM] (listing the notional value for December 2010, denoted as
“H2 2010”). The 4.83% figure is determined as follows: 630,149 – 601,046 = 29,103; 29,103 /
601,046 = .0484205868; .0484 * 100 = 4.84%.
45 Jake Saifman, XIV. International Derivatives Policy and the CFTC’s
Proposed Rules on Overseas Swaps, 33 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 556, 557 (2014).
46 Michael
McCaffrey, An Introduction to Swaps, INVESTOPEDIA,
http://www.investopedia.com/articles/optioninvestor/07/swaps.asp#axzz1uiFvypXs
[http://perma.cc/87N5-6CCG] (last visited Nov. 30, 2015) [hereinafter McCaffrey, An
Introduction to Swaps]. The notional principle is “the predetermined dollar amount[] on
which the exchanged interest payments are based. Notional principal never changes
hands in the transaction, which is why it is considered notional, or theoretical. Neither
party pays or receives the notional principal amount at any time; only interest rate
payments change hands.” Root, Notional Principle Amount, INVESTOPEDIA (Nov. 24,
2003), http://www.investopedia.com/terms/n/notionalprincipalamount.asp [http://perma.cc/
NWJ9-95Q2]; see also Molony, supra note 3, at 953-54 (explaining the exchanges that
take place in a swap transaction and the treatment of the notional principle).
47 McCaffrey, An Introduction to Swaps, supra note 46. Recently, there has
been significant turmoil originating from allegations that LIBOR is “fixed” by the
member banks which determine it. For further reading, see The Libor Scandal: The
Rotten Heart of Finance, ECONOMIST (July 7, 2012), http://www.economist.com/node/
21558281 [http://perma.cc/7CL2-TZRS]; Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., Turning a Blind Eye:
Why Washington Keeps Giving in to Wall Street, 81 U. CIN. L. REV. 1283, 1323-24 (2013).
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on a stock or [equity] index.”48 Similar to a plain-vanilla interest
rate swap, the opposing party’s payment can “be based on a
floating interest rate,” such as LIBOR, a fixed rate, or on another
stock or equity index’s return.49 These swaps can also be
structured so that notional principle is either fixed or floating.
While all swap agreements begin with “an initial value of
zero,” in security-based swaps, “with the passage of time and
change of market conditions, the swap may have a negative value
for one party and a positive value for the other party.”50 This is
because, unlike interest rates, the return on a company’s stock or
on an index—which references equities (e.g., the S&P 500)—can
be negative.51 The downside is compounded by the potential
threat that accompanies all swaps: that the party with the
negative value will default.52 This counterparty credit risk, which
is greater in security-based swaps than in interest rate swaps (as
a result of equities’ potential for negative returns and
counterparties’ desire to avoid them), can be caused by a number
of factors and is very difficult to predict.53
C.

What Makes Security-Based Swaps Valuable?

In general, the core utility of swaps is their ability to
provide investors with a unique and non-capital-intensive form
of speculation, a risk management tool, and a form of financing
that they either (a) might not have available to them, or (b)
might not be able to profit from on their own.54 For instance,
“domestic firm[s] can usually receive better [interest] rates
than a foreign firm,” so a U.S. firm and a U.K. firm can both
achieve the benefits of a domestic rate in a foreign market if
each borrows in their respective country and then the firms

DON M. CHANCE, Equity Swaps, in ESSAYS IN DERIVATIVES 67 (2d ed. 2008).
Id.
50 Introduction to Swaps, FIN. TRAIN, http://financetrain.com/introduction-toswaps [http://perma.cc/L83Q-LVF4] (last visited Nov. 30, 2015).
51 CHANCE, supra note 48, at 67.
52 Id.
53 Ian A. Cooper & Antonio S. Mello, The Default Risk of Swaps, 46 J. OF FIN. 597,
599 (1991) (discussing factors that create counterparty credit risk, such as “the value of the
swap at the default date, the event that will trigger the swap default, the relationship
between the value of the swap and the event triggering default, and the rule for sharing
claims in default”).
54 What Are Interest Rate Swaps and How Do They Work, PIMCO (Jan. 2008),
http://europe.pimco.com/EN/Education/Pages/InterestRateSwapsBasics1-08.aspx
[http://
perma.cc/VV3H-D8NK]. While this article focuses on interest rate swaps, the benefits
described are shared by security-based swaps as well.
48
49

370

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 81:1

swap their favorable interest rates.55 Additionally, swaps are of
immense value to investors who look to hedge against volatile
returns (of interest rates or equities) “by reducing the
uncertainty of future cash flows . . . [,] allow[ing] companies to
revise their debt conditions to take advantage of current or
expected future market conditions,” and providing exposure to
foreign markets.56
By their nature, security-based swaps are tailored to
managing issues that arise from cross-border investing. For
example, Investor A, who owns only U.S. stocks, can face hurdles
when trying to internationally diversify his portfolio. Simply
selling domestic stock to buy foreign stock, while seemingly
workable, is actually inefficient due to the high transaction costs57
typically associated with buying and selling foreign stocks.58 This
issue is often compounded by conflicting legal requirements, the
investors’ diminished ability to obtain a foreign company’s
financial information, “custodial fees, and, in particular, the
dividend withholding tax.”59
Enter the security-based swap. If Investor A and a foreign
counterparty, Investor B, agree to exchange the returns on their
respective equity indices, both parties will avoid the transaction
costs of purchasing the equity itself while still receiving the gains
(or losses) of the foreign equity index; the originally sought after
diversification is achieved. Furthermore, these parties can add
another component to the transaction by hedging against
currency risk.60 In our example, Investor A could participate in
the growth of the foreign stock market without exposing his
55 Nicola Sargeant, How Do Companies Benefit From Interest Rate and Currency
Swaps?, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/ask/answers/06/benefitsofswaps.asp
[http://perma.cc/7R88-HZGZ] (last visited Nov. 30, 2015) [hereinafter Sargeant, How Do
Companies Benefit?]; see also McCaffrey, An Introduction to Swaps, supra note 46
(describing how swaps can be used to meet a company’s commercial needs or benefit from a
comparative advantage).
56 Sargeant, How Do Companies Benefit?, supra note 55.
57 “Transaction costs include brokers’ commissions and spreads (the difference
between the price the dealer paid for a security and the price the buyer pays).” Root,
Transaction Costs, INVESTOPEDIA (Nov. 24, 2003) http://www.investopedia.com/terms/
t/transactioncosts.asp#ixzz3jrqpNGqZ [http://perma.cc/SZ74-2L6Y].
58 CHANCE, supra note 48, at 67.
59 Id.
60 Id. at 67-68. Currency risk refers to the possibility that the value of the currency
used in the transaction will decline before the transaction is completed, which will therefore
result in a loss when the profits from the transaction are converted into the domestic currency.
See Root, Currency Risk, INVESTOPEDIA (May 11, 2005), http://www.investopedia.com/
terms/c/currencyrisk.asp [http://perma.cc/3V2B-537P]. Compare CHANCE, supra note 48, at
68-69 (describing the benefits of hedging currency risk through the use of a security-based
swap), with Feder, supra note 37, at 718-19 (noting that some corporations prefer to “selfinsure” their currency risks as an alternative to using derivatives).
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transaction to currency risk by basing the foreign payments on a
U.S. dollar notional amount.61 Conversely, parties to securitybased swaps have the ability to double their gains (or losses) by
receiving payments based on a foreign currency denominated
notional principle.62 As the name might suggest, security-based
swaps can also reference a specific stock. Though less common
than using an index as the base, these contracts can aid
individuals, such as executives of a firm, who would otherwise
have no way to hedge against their large exposure to a particular
stock (possibly because of SEC regulations).63
If nothing else, the sheer magnitude of the everexpanding swap market demonstrates the value that companies
and investors derive from engaging in swap transactions—value
that has contributed to the “meteoric expansion [of the OTC
market] over the past several decades.”64 According to the Bank
for International Settlements, equity-linked forward and swap
contracts accounted for $2.495 trillion of the outstanding
notional amount of all OTC contracts as of December 2014,
which represented an uptick of $218 billion over just 12
months.65 Critically, the forwards and swaps linked to U.S.
equities only accounted for $881 billion of the $2.495 trillion
outstanding total, leaving agreements linked to foreign equities
to account for the remaining $1.614 trillion.66 This means that
large companies and savvy investors who hope to remain
competitive need to participate in cross-border security-based
swaps to some degree, because their peers are most likely
realizing gains through their own participation. By the same
token, global policymakers can ill afford to ignore the swap
market; deregulation could encourage reckless spending and
fraud, which could lead to the failure of large companies and
general havoc in national economies. Accordingly, there is both a
private-sector need to grant investors the ability to protect
themselves against fraudulent transactions and an incentive for
61 CHANCE, supra note 48, at 67-68; see also Notional Principal Amount,
supra note 46 and accompanying text (explaining the concept of a notional amount).
62 CHANCE, supra note 48, at 67-68.
63 Id. For a detailed explanation of the various permutations that can be
made from security-based swaps and their pricing methodology, see John F. Marshall
& Robert P. Yuyuenyonwatana, Equity Swaps: Structures, Uses, and Pricing, in
FINANCIAL ENGINEERING, THE HANDBOOK OF EQUITY DERIVATIVES 343-60 (Jack Clark
Francis et al. eds., 2000).
64 David He, Note, Beyond Securities Fraud: The Territorial Reach of U.S.
Laws After Morrison v. N.A.B., 2013 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 148, 179 n.128 (2013).
65 See BIS TABLE 19, supra note 11.
66 BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, BIS DERIVATIVES STATISTICS, tbl. 22B
(2014), http://www.bis.org/statistics/dt22b22c.pdf [http://perma.cc/T5UK-G3VD].
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the public sector to develop regulations on a global scale through
coordination with foreign policymakers.
D.

Dodd-Frank and OTC Derivatives Reforms

Beginning in 1989, the OTC derivatives market was given
a long regulatory leash.67 The trend towards regulatory
liberalization culminated with the Commodities Futures
Modernization Act of 2000, which allowed qualified counterparties
to exclude many of their OTC derivatives transactions from
regulation.68 While this allowed for exponential growth in the OTC
derivatives markets, the 2007–2008 financial crisis “revealed
fundamental weaknesses in the OTC market, including lack of
price transparency, opacity of risk characteristics and insufficient
collateralization.”69 Investors generally did not understand or did
not have information on the true risks of their investments, and
this contributed to inadequate collateral requirements that did
not provide the necessary security in cases of default.
To address these structural flaws, President Obama
signed the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act into law.70 With regard to swaps, Title VII of
Dodd-Frank established a new regulatory framework for the
derivatives71 and sought to “reduce and contain systemic risk
and to increase transparency in the OTC derivatives market”72
through four main provisions:
(1) Providing for the registration and comprehensive regulation of
swap dealers and major swap participants (each, an “MSP”); (2)
imposing clearing and trade execution requirements on standardized
derivatives products; (3) creating rigorous recordkeeping and data
reporting regimes with respect to swaps, including real-time public
reporting; and (4) enhancing the Commission’s rulemaking and

67 For instance, the CFTC established a nonexclusive “safe harbor” provision
for transactions that met certain qualifications that sheltered them from regulation.
Policy Statement Concerning Swap Transactions, 54 Fed. Reg. 30694 (July 21, 1989);
see also Lucy McKinstry, Note, Regulating a Global Market: The Extraterritorial
Challenge of Dodd-Frank’s Margin Requirements for Uncleared OTC Derivatives & a
Mutual Recognition Solution, 51 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 776, 791 (2013) (detailing
the derivatives market’s “transition to regulatory liberalization”).
68 McKinstry, supra note 67, at 792.
69 Id. at 794.
70 Id. at 781-82; see Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection
Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
71 Title VII separated swaps into three categories: “swaps,” “security-based
swaps,” and “mixed swaps.” 7 U.S.C. § 1a(47) (2012) (definition of “Swap”); 15 U.S.C.
§ 78c(a)(68) (2012) (definition of “security-based swap”); 7 U.S.C. § 1a(47)(D) (2012)
(definition of “Mixed swap”); 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(68)(D) (2012) (definition of “Mixed swap”).
72 CHATHAM FIN., supra note 20, at 1.
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enforcement authorities over all registered entities, intermediaries,
and swap counterparties subject to the Commission’s oversight.73

In furtherance of provision (4), Title VII also required the
CFTC and the SEC to create new regulatory regimes for swaps
and security-based swaps, respectively.74
Also included in the thousand plus pages of Dodd-Frank
was Title IX, termed the Investor Protection and Securities
Reform Act of 2010.75 The purpose of this section, which made
alterations to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, was to
expand the extraterritorial reach of U.S. securities fraud
regulations, thereby allowing the SEC to skirt the presumption
against extraterritoriality after the U.S. Supreme Court’s
decision in Morrison.76 This presumption, which the court in
Morrison used as the basis for its landmark decision, “is a
longstanding principle of American law” that states that
“legislation of Congress, unless a contrary intent appears, is
meant to apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of the
United States.”77 Hence, in the context of securities litigation,
this presumption’s predisposition to prevent U.S. securities
laws from applying to international transactions can
significantly alter the protection afforded to parties in crossborder security-based swap transactions.
II.

THE CONTRACTION OF THE U.S. SECURITY-BASED SWAP
MARKET

Before Dodd-Frank and the 2007–2008 financial crisis,
the regulatory landscape governing swaps and other OTC
derivatives was much different than what it has evolved into
today. The developing negative synergy between recently
decided cases, which give too much deference to the presumption
against extraterritoriality, and the SEC’s application of DoddFrank in the cross-border security-based swap context, has led
to an environment that leaves no incentive for private investors
to conduct security-based swap transactions within the borders
of the United States.
73 Commodities Futures Trading Commission, Interpretive Guidance and
Policy Statement Regarding Compliance With Certain Swap Regulations, 78 Fed. Reg.
45293 (July 26, 2013) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. ch. 1) (citation omitted).
74 McKinstry, supra note 67, at 795.
75 Investor Protection and Securities Reform Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111203, 124 Stat. 1822 (codified as amended in separate sections of 15 U.S.C.).
76 Kornfeld, supra note 12, at *12; see infra Section II.A.2.
77 Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 255 (2010) (quoting
EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991)).
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The Toll on the Private Sector: Elliott’s Test Eliminates
Private Recourse

Prompted by the 1929 stock market crash, the Roosevelt
administration developed groundbreaking regulations to
govern “the purchase and sale of publicly traded securities.”78
The first major resulting piece of legislation was the Securities
Act of 1933, which dealt with original issues of securities in the
primary market.79 Congress did not ignore the secondary
market, though, and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
specifically acknowledged “the tremendous prominence of the
secondary trading market and the need to extend federal
regulation to include both securities issued and also those
outstanding” by creating the SEC and granting it authority to
conduct securities-related civil investigations.80
Among the various provisions of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, Section 10(b), together with its
implementing SEC Rule 10b-5, has become the most commonly
used, forceful, and controversial tool for alleging securities
fraud. Section 10(b) prohibits fraudulent conduct “in connection
with the purchase or sale of any security.”81 Rule 10b-5 further
specifies that a cause of action exists when a defendant
knowingly makes a material misrepresentation or omission
that is relied upon by a plaintiff and that causes an economic
loss to the plaintiff.82 Courts have consistently found that this
protection applies to actions brought by the SEC and private

78 Jacob True, What Counts as a Domestic Transaction Anymore: The Second
Circuit and Other Lower Courts’ Struggles in Interpreting the Supreme Court’s Intent in
Morrison v. Australia National Bank When Dealing with Derivative Securities
Transactions, 10 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 513, 516 (2014).
79 15 U.S.C. § 77a (2012). The primary market is where securities are sold by
companies to the public for the first time. This is opposed to the secondary market, where
stocks are traded freely between investors. A Look at Primary and Secondary Markets,
INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/articles/02/101102.asp [http://perma.cc/P7TLRKA9] (last visited Nov. 30, 2015).
80 He, supra note 64, at 154.
81 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2012).
82 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2010) (“It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or
indirectly, by the user of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the
mails or of any facility of any national securities exchange, (a) To employ any device,
scheme, or artifice to defraud, (b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to
omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of
the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or (c) To engage in any act,
practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any
person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.”).
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rights of action, despite a lack of express language within the
statute to that effect.83
The controversy surrounding Rule 10b-5 in this context
stems from its applicability outside of the United States. Congress
did not address whether, and to what extent, section 10(b)’s reach
would expand beyond the geographic borders of the United States
to include foreign investors, foreign defendants, and foreign
transactions. This “foreign-cubed” scenario caused friction with
the presumption against extraterritoriality and remained a
source of uncertainty until the Supreme Court’s 2010 decision in
Morrison v. NAB, which delineated two purportedly bright-line
scenarios that would give rise to a cause of action under section
10(b).84 But because of the complex and highly individualized
nature of the instruments that make up the financial industry,
courts quickly discovered that applying Morrison often involved
fitting a square peg into a round hole. As a result, lower courts
created layers of interpretation that attempted to adapt Morrison
to a wide array of factual circumstances.85 One such layer was
created in Elliott Associates v. Porsche Automobil Holding SE,
where a district court in the Southern District of New York
utilized a new “economic reality” test that ultimately missed the
mark and incorrectly interpreted Morrison.86
1. The Law Before Morrison
Forty years before the Supreme Court announced its
decision in Morrison, courts were left to their own devices when
interpreting the extraterritorial impact of 10b-5. When the
Second Circuit decided Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, it created the
effects test, which laid the groundwork for the accepted
standard.87 In Schoenbaum, the Second Circuit held that the
strength of the legislative interest in protecting U.S. investors
83 See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 730 (1975);
Superintendent of Ins. of State of N.Y. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9 (1971).
84 Foreign-cubed cases are implicated when a “(1) foreign plaintiff[ ] is suing (2)
a foreign issuer in an American court for violations of American securities laws based on
securities transactions in (3) foreign countries.” Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 547
F.3d 167, 172 (2d Cir. 2008) aff’d, 561 U.S. 247 (2010).
85 See Absolute Activist Value Master Fund Ltd. v. Ficeto, 677 F.3d 60 (2d Cir.
2012); United States v. Martoma, No. 12-cr-973, 2013 WL 6632676 (S.D.N.Y. 2013); U.S.
SEC v. Chicago Convention Ctr., LLC, 961 F. Supp. 2d 905 (N.D. Ill. 2013); In re Société
Générale Sec. Litig., No. 08-cv-2495, 2010 WL 3910286 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
86 Elliott Assocs. v. Porsche Auto. Holding SE, 759 F. Supp. 2d 469 (S.D.N.Y.
2010), aff’d sub nom. Parkcentral Glob. Hub Ltd. v. Porsche Auto. Holdings SE, 763
F.3d 198 (2d Cir. 2014).
87 Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200, 206 (2d Cir. 1968), abrogated by
Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247 (2010).
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and the U.S. market justified the regulation of foreign conduct
that results in harmful effects within the United States.88 The
Second Circuit later added to the Schoenbaum standard by
establishing the conduct test in Leasco Data Processing
Equipment Corp. v. Maxwell, which made protection available to
plaintiffs when the stocks in question were listed on foreign
exchanges and in foreign-cubed cases.89 The conduct test was
refined several years after its inception,90 and together with the
effects test became the prevailing standard (aptly referred to as
the “conduct and effects test”) that courts applied in securities
antifraud cases in the decades leading up to Morrison.91
2. Setting a New Standard: Morrison and Absolute Activist
The Morrison decision overhauled the conduct and
effects test and created a new foundation for Rule 10b-5
lawsuits, at least with respect to privately raised actions. In
1998, National Australia Bank (NAB) acquired HomeSide
Lending, Inc. (HomeSide), a Florida-based mortgage servicing
company.92 For three years from the time of the acquisition,
NAB executives “touted the success of HomeSide’s business,”
which had significantly contributed to an increase in NAB’s
stock price.93 In July 2001, however, NAB announced that it
would be forced to write down94 the value of HomeSide’s assets
due to HomeSide’s improper accounting methods and faulty
valuation models. The total cost of the write-down amounted to
more than $2 billion over two months.95
Four of NAB’s investors96 responded by bringing suit
against the company and alleging, among other claims, that
Schoenbaum, 405 F.2d at 208.
Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326 (2d Cir.
1972), abrogated by Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247 (2010).
90 See Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 1000 (2d Cir. 1975),
abrogated by Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247 (2010); IIT v. Vencap,
Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1017-1018 (2d Cir. 1975), abrogated by Morrison v. Nat’l Austl.
Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247 (2010).
91 He, supra note 64, at 158. Although the conduct and effects test became
the standard, courts did not apply it consistently. Id.
92 NAB was “one of the ‘Big Four’ Australian banks, and one of the world’s
fifty largest banks by assets.” Id. at 159.
93 Morrison, 561 U.S. at 251-52.
94 A “write-down” refers to reducing the listed value of an asset on a company’s
financial statements. See Write-Down, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/
terms/w/writedown.asp [http://perma.cc/R672-5MN9] (last visited Nov. 30, 2015).
95 Morrison, 561 U.S. at 252.
96 Three of the plaintiffs were Australian owners of NAB’s ordinary shares.
The fourth plaintiff, Robert Morrison, was an American investor in NAB’s ADRs.
88

89
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NAB had violated section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act
by artificially raising the price of its shares through its support
and promotion of HomeSide’s indiscretions.97 Problematically
for these investors, NAB’s shares were not offered on any U.S.
exchange.98 This led the district court in the Southern District
of New York to grant NAB’s motion to dismiss, and the Second
Circuit later affirmed.99 After granting certiorari, the Supreme
Court affirmed the decision of the lower courts in 2010, but on
different grounds.
Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, first dispelled
the notion that section 10(b)’s extraterritorial reach was an
issue of subject-matter jurisdiction.100 With the issue reframed
as a question of statutory interpretation, the Court examined
the text of section 10(b) and determined that, based upon the
presumption against extraterritoriality, Congress intended for
the Exchange Act to apply to foreign-cubed cases where the
defendant sought to “conceal a domestic violation, or might
cause what would otherwise be a domestic violation to escape
on a technicality.”101 In the Court’s view, the conduct and
effects test did not sufficiently reflect this tenet, because “the
focus of the Exchange Act is . . . upon [the] purchases and sales
of securities in the United States.”102 As a replacement test, the
Court developed a two-pronged, bright-line transactional test
that recognizes the existence of a cause of action under section
10(b) only when the deception relates to either (1) “transactions in
securities listed on domestic exchanges,” or (2) “domestic
transactions in other securities.”103 The plaintiffs’ claims against
NAB did not meet the new standard and were dismissed.
As the Supreme Court created a rule, so were the lower
courts left to interpret it. And while “transactions in securities
listed on domestic exchanges” is fairly straightforward,
Morrison “provide[d] little guidance as to what constitutes a
domestic purchase or sale.”104 The Second Circuit was tasked
with interpreting this second prong in Absolute Activist Value
Although his claim was dismissed for failure to allege damages, he remained a named
petitioner. Id. at 252, 252 n.1. For an explanation of ADRs, see infra Section III.A.
97 Morrison, 561 U.S. at 252-53.
98 Id. at 251.
99 Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 547 F.3d 167, 177 (2d Cir. 2008) aff’d,
561 U.S. 247 (2010).
100 Morrison, 561 U.S. at 254.
101 Id. at 264.
102 Id. at 266.
103 Id. at 267.
104 Absolute Activist Value Master Fund Ltd. v. Ficeto, 677 F.3d 60, 67 (2d
Cir. 2012).
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Master Fund Ltd. v. Ficeto.105 There, the court found that in
order for a transaction in a foreign-listed security to be
considered domestic, one party must incur “irrevocable
liability,” meaning “that the purchaser incurred irrevocable
liability within the United States to take and pay for a
security, or that the seller incurred irrevocable liability within
the United States to deliver a security.”106 Yet despite its own
holding in Absolute Activist, the Second Circuit elected not to
apply the irrevocable liability test just two years later in
Parkcentral and instead endeavored to add another level of
interpretation to Morrison’s transactional test.
3. A Crack in the Foundation: Elliott and Parkcentral
Parkcentral was the Second Circuit’s opportunity to
remedy the legal quagmire that resulted from the transactional
test created in Morrison—this time with a specific focus on
privately brought actions involving security-based swaps. In
affirming the district court’s ruling, the Second Circuit
concentrated its analysis on whether a domestic transaction or
listing is either necessary or sufficient to state a claim under
section 10(b).107 The court, however, did not address the
appropriateness of the economic reality test that the district
court used to dismiss the plaintiffs’ claims and therefore did
not consider whether the economic reality test is consistent
with Morrison. Problematically, it is not.
Parkcentral began as two consolidated actions in which
39 hedge funds, approximately half of which were organized
under foreign jurisdictions, sought the enforcement of rule 10b5 against German automaker Porsche.108 The complaint was
originally filed in the Southern District of New York under the
name Elliott Associates v. Porsche Automobil Holding SE.109 In
the complaint, the plaintiff hedge funds described entering into
security-based swap agreements with counterparties that they
alleged were, to varying degrees, located within the United

Id. at 62.
Id. at 68.
107 Parkcentral Glob. Hub Ltd. v. Porsche Auto. Holdings SE, 763 F.3d 198,
214-16 (2d Cir. 2014).
108 Elliott Assocs. v. Porsche Auto. Holding SE, 759 F. Supp. 2d 469, 471
(S.D.N.Y. 2010), aff’d sub nom. Parkcentral Glob. Hub Ltd. v. Porsche Auto. Holdings
SE, 763 F.3d 198 (2d Cir. 2014).
109 Id.
105

106
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States.110 “The swap agreements contained New York choice-oflaw provisions and forum selection clauses designating New
York federal and state courts as the forum in which legal
disputes would be heard.”111 But Porsche was not a party to any
of the plaintiffs’ swaps, nor was Porsche’s stock the referenced
security in any of the transactions.112
In fact, the referenced shares were of another German
auto manufacturer and one of Porsche’s competitors,
Volkswagen (VW). The swaps were structured such that they
would emulate a “short” position on VW’s stock—the hedge
funds would profit if the value of VW shares fell and absorb
losses if the value rose.113 The plaintiffs allegedly “bet
on . . . [the] decline” of VW’s shares based on Porsche’s public
statements denouncing its interest in a takeover of the
company.114 This led plaintiffs to believe that VW’s shares were
overvalued and would therefore decline in share price,
resulting in a profit to the plaintiffs’ swap agreements.115
In actuality, the price moved sharply in the opposite
direction. Porsche eventually announced that it was close to
reaching a “domination agreement” with VW, which under
German law “allows the acquiring firm [in a takeover] to control
the target firm’s decisions.”116 The news of the takeover caused
the price of VW’s shares to nearly quintuple in value as
investors who—similar to plaintiffs—had bet on a decline in the
value of VW’s shares were forced to “scramble to purchase the
shares they needed to unwind their short sales and limit their
losses.”117 Plaintiffs asserted that this was “part of a secret plan
to take over [VW]” that Porsche perpetrated in order to avoid

110 Parkcentral Glob. Hub Ltd., 763 F.3d at 207 (“Some of the plaintiffs allege
that their investment managers took all steps necessary to transact the securitiesbased swap agreements from their offices in New York City. Others allege that their
investment managers signed a confirmation required by [the] . . . swap counterparty in
New York City. Still others allege more specifically that their swap transactions were
entered into, terminated, and based entirely in the United States, with Deutsche Bank
in New York acting as the counterparty, or that their swap agreements were entered
into with New York-based Morgan Stanley in the United States, or that their
counterparties were acting . . . on behalf of financial institutions located in New
York . . . .” (citations omitted)).
111 Id.
112 Id. Such is the advantage of a security-based swap, which allows parties to bet
on the returns of an equity without involving the issuing party. See supra Section I.C.
113 Elliott Assocs., 759 F. Supp. 2d at 471.
114 Parkcentral Glob. Hub Ltd., 763 F.3d at 203.
115 Id.
116 Id. at 202 n.1.
117 Id. at 205.
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German securities laws regarding takeovers.118 The hedge funds’
losses totaled approximately $38 billion.119
To begin its analysis, the court noted that “[i]t is
eminently clear that, as a general matter, § 10(b) applies with
equal force to securities and securities-based swap agreements.”120
This afforded security-based swaps an important and definitive
place within the domestic protective scope of Rule 10b-5.121 But
the court continued its discussion, stating: (a) because the
plaintiffs’ swaps were “effectively transacted on a foreign
exchange” and were therefore “economically equivalent to the
purchase of VW’s shares,” and (b) because the value of a
security-based swap is necessarily dependent on the value of the
underlying security, “the nature of the reference security must
play a role in determining whether a transnational swap
agreement may be afforded the protection of § 10(b).”122 The
court therefore looked beyond the geographic bases of the swaps
and the parties and instead examined the location of the
shares—in this case, VW’s stock—from which the security-based
swaps derived their value.
The result, according to the court, was the “economic
reality . . . that Plaintiffs’ swap agreements . . . [were] essentially
‘transactions conducted upon foreign exchanges and markets,’
and not ‘domestic transactions’ that merit the protection of
§ 10(b).”123 Based on this “economic reality” or “functional
equivalent” test, the court dismissed the plaintiffs’ claims, and the
plaintiffs appealed to the Second Circuit.
Although the Second Circuit noted that Elliott was
decided after Morrison but before Absolute Activist, it did not
utilize the irrevocable liability standard in its review of the swaps’
domestic characteristics. Instead, the court added another tier to
the growing list of Morrison-spawned interpretive guidelines. “A
question of potentially determinative importance,” the court
opined, “is whether, under Morrison, a domestic transaction in a
security (or a transaction in a domestically listed security)—in
addition to being a necessary element of a domestic § 10(b) claim—
is also sufficient to make a particular invocation of § 10(b)
appropriately domestic.”124 The court held that while a domestic
118
119
120
121
122
123
124

Elliott Assocs., 759 F. Supp. 2d at 470.
Parkcentral Glob. Hub Ltd., 763 F.3d at 205.
Elliott Assocs., 759 F. Supp. 2d at 475.
Id.
Id. at 475-76.
Id. (emphasis added).
Parkcentral Glob. Hub Ltd., 763 F.3d at 214.
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transaction is necessary to invoke section 10(b), it is not always
sufficient based on the details of the parties and the transactions.125
This fact-driven rubric reinforced the presumption
against extraterritoriality and reflected the court’s fear that,
were all domestic transactions viewed as sufficient to satisfy
the Morrison test, foreign parties anywhere in the world could
be haled into U.S. courts for wholly foreign conduct.126 The
court went on to explain the validity of its “necessary versus
sufficient” analysis:
If the domestic execution of the plaintiffs’ agreements could alone
suffice to invoke § 10(b) liability with respect to the defendants’
alleged conduct in this case, then it would subject to U.S. securities
laws conduct that occurred in a foreign country, concerning
securities in a foreign company, traded entirely on foreign
exchanges, in the absence of any congressional provision addressing
the incompatibility of U.S. and foreign law nearly certain to arise.
That is a result Morrison plainly did not contemplate and that the
Court’s reasoning does not, we think, permit.127

Notably, the court limited its opinion by narrowing its holding
to the case at hand, stating, “We do not purport to proffer a test
that will reliably determine when a particular invocation of
§ 10(b) will be deemed appropriately domestic or impermissibly
extraterritorial.”128
This case-by-case, factually intensive analysis seems at first
glance to run contrary to Morrison’s purpose, which was to create a
bright-line transactional test governing the extraterritorial
application of U.S. securities laws. As the Second Circuit noted,
however, “the [Supreme] Court did not say that . . . [a domestic
securities transaction] was sufficient to make . . . [section 10(b)]
applicable.”129 The Second Circuit’s reluctance to create a brightline test demonstrated a respect for the rapidly transforming
nature of financial derivatives and a recognition that, just as a
bright-line test can be a beacon for those who wish to abide by the
law, it can also be a lighthouse for those who wish to avoid it.130

Id. at 215.
Id. at 213-14.
127 Id. at 215-16.
128 Id. at 217.
129 Id. at 215.
130 This and other concerns were espoused by Judge Leval in his concurrence.
Id. at 218-21 (Leval, J., concurring).
125
126
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4. Elliott’s Economic Reality Test Inaccurately Interprets
Morrison
The issue with the Parkcentral ruling is not the
somewhat amorphous new level of interpretation it added to
Morrison’s transactional test, but rather its failure to explicitly
rule on whether the economic reality test applied by the district
court was consistent with the spirit of Morrison’s transactional
test. Before the Second Circuit issued the Parkcentral decision,
courts and scholars alike expressed skepticism of whether the
use of the economic reality test in Elliott was an accurate
adaptation of the Morrison framework. In Wu v. Stomber, the
District Court for the District of Columbia declined to follow
Elliott’s reasoning, stating,
[T]he “functional equivalent” gloss that the Elliott . . . court[ ] ha[s]
developed is inconsistent with the bright line test set forth by the
Supreme Court in Morrison, which focuses specifically and
exclusively on where the plaintiff ’ s purchase occurred. The Supreme
Court was clear in its holding that “the focus of the Exchange Act is
not upon the place where the deception originated, but upon
purchases and sales of securities in the United States.”131

Many scholars and practitioners similarly criticized the
economic reality test for wrongly interpreting the language of
Morrison—the crux of their arguments similarly concentrating
on the economic reality test’s failure to embody Morrison’s sole
focus on location.132 As former SEC Commissioner Roberta
131 Wu v. Stomber, 883 F. Supp. 2d 233, 253 (D.D.C. 2012) (quoting Morrison
v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 266 (2010)).
132 See Christina M. Corcoran, The Post-Morrison Challenge—The Growing
Irrelevance of a Transaction-Based Test in an Interconnected World: An Analysis of the
Extraterritorial Application of Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and
the International Comity Implications in the Wake of Morrison, 26 N.Y. INT’L L. REV.
77, 89 (2013) (“While the [Elliott] court’s rationale makes sense from a policy
perspective, it does not fit squarely within the guidelines of Morrison’s transactionbased test, which applies section 10(b) to ‘the purchase or sale of any other security in
the United States.’”); Roger W. Kirby, Access to United States Courts by Purchasers of
Foreign Listed Securities in the Aftermath of Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd.,
7 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 223, 255 (2011) (“Although a purpose built decision like Morrison
might arrive at the same conclusion as the district court in [Elliott], what is ‘eminently
clear’ is that the decision in . . . [Elliott] is analytically unsound. Swaps generally settle
in relation to the referenced instrument or index, and generally do not result in the
purchase or sale of an actual share of stock. The actual holding of bright-lined Morrison
was that § 10(b) explicitly reaches ‘the purchase or sale of any other [than American
Stock Exchange] security in the United States.’ The swap instruments in question were
securities purchased or sold in the United States. The decision in . . . [Elliott] was
wrongly decided.”); see also JONATHAN E. RICHMAN & RALPH C. FERRARA, U.S. APPEALS
COURT REJECTS BRIGHT-LINE TEST FOR EXTRATERRITORIAL REACH OF U.S. SECURITIES
LAWS, WORLD SEC. L. REPORT 4 (Sept. 5, 2014) (highlighting the Second Circuit’s
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Karmel prophesized in 2013, “[I]t is unlikely that consistency
in the application of the Morrison standard will occur.”133 Such
is the case in the wake of Elliott.
A prime example of this inconsistency occurs in the
treatment of American Depository Receipts (ADRs), which are
certificates issued by U.S. banks that represent the stock of a
foreign company.134 The Southern District of New York’s
jurisprudence holds that transactions in ADRs will only fall under
U.S. securities laws if the ADRs are traded on a U.S. exchange,
regardless of the fact that the economic reality of an OTC-traded
ADR versus an exchange-traded ADR may be exactly the same,
the only difference being the formality of the market.135
The court in Parkcentral chose not only to decline to use
the economic reality test, but also to leave the test’s validity
entirely unaddressed. The Second Circuit thus missed the
opportunity to announce that the economic reality test was an
inaccurate interpretation of Morrison. Quite simply, if all parties
to a transaction are located within the United States, the contract
includes U.S. choice-of-law and forum selection clauses, and the
transaction is in fact completed in the United States, then
because the “purchases and sales of securities [occurred] in the
United States,” the requirements of Morrison are met. Indeed, the
Second Circuit itself stated in Absolute Activist that
we do not believe . . . [irrevocable liability] is the only way to locate a
securities transaction . . . . [T]o sufficiently allege a domestic securities
transaction in securities not listed on a domestic exchange, we hold
that a plaintiff must allege facts suggesting that irrevocable liability
was incurred or title was transferred within the United States.136

The economic reality analysis does not reflect this truth.
This test is especially detrimental to parties who transact
in security-based swaps. Part of the unique and inherent value
of these derivatives is their ability to realize the gains and losses
of a stock without forcing either party to purchase the actual
failure in the Parkcentral decision to “resolve whether the economic-reality analysis is
consistent with Morrison”).
133 Roberta S. Karmel, The Application of ‘Morrison’ To SEC and Criminal
Cases, N.Y. L.J., Oct. 17, 2013, at 3.
134 See infra Part III (describing ADRs in greater detail).
135 Compare In re Société Générale Sec. Litig., No. 08-cv-2495, 2010 WL
3910286 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (declining to apply U.S. laws to OTC-ADR transactions), with
United States v. Martoma, No. 12-cr-973, 2013 WL 6632676 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (applying
U.S. laws to exchange-traded ADR transactions). See infra Section III.A for a detailed
description of ADRs.
136 Absolute Activist Value Master Fund Ltd. v. Ficeto, 677 F.3d 60, 68 (2d
Cir. 2012) (emphasis added).
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referenced shares. In addition, these swaps frequently reference
international stocks, as they are commonly used to gain
exposure to foreign markets.137 The economic reality test
effectively leaves U.S. swap participants without domestic
recourse when the referenced shares are of a foreign company on
a foreign exchange.
Importantly, the Second Circuit did not impliedly affirm
the utility of the economic reality test in its Parkcentral decision.
Even though the Parkcentral court billed its “necessary versus
sufficient” analysis as an interpretation of Morrison’s test, in
reality, it created an entirely new, discrete test. Now, a party
must first satisfy the Morrison requirement of a domestic
transaction by location and then satisfy the Parkcentral factual
analysis. This creates a hostile environment for any privately
raised Rule 10b-5 actions that involve cross-border securitybased swaps.
B.

The Toll on the Public Sector: The SEC’s Final Rules
and Interpretive Guidance Miss the Mark

While Morrison and its progeny have significantly eroded
the viability of a private right of action for securities fraud in the
context of security-based swaps, because of the Dodd-Frank Act,
public rights of action have not been affected in the same
manner. Title VII of Dodd-Frank created a new regulatory
framework for the use of swaps, with the objective of increasing
transparency and reducing system-wide risk.138 On August 12,
2014, the SEC adopted finalized rules and guidance to address
this new framework in the context of cross-border security-based
swaps in “Application of ‘Security-Based Swap Dealer’ and
‘Major Security-Based Swap Participant’ Definitions to CrossBorder Security-Based Swap Activities; Republication” (the
August Publication).139 These rules and guidance were intended
to clarify “the application of the Title VII definitions of ‘securitybased swap dealer’ and ‘major security-based swap participant’
in the cross-border context.”140 While the August Publication did
provide a new level of clarification to Dodd-Frank’s applicability
in this area, its approach may discourage investors from
engaging in security-based swaps with U.S. counterparties.
137 Indeed, the SEC recognized that “[s]ecurity-based swap transactions are
largely cross-border in practice.” The August Publication, supra note 21, at 47,280.
138 See supra Section I.D.
139 The August Publication, supra note 21.
140 Id. at 47,278.
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1. The SEC’s Authority Post-Morrison
When the Supreme Court decided Morrison, one of its
major concerns was a fear that rebuffing the presumption against
extraterritoriality would degrade the principles of international
comity. In a pointed statement, Justice Scalia noted that “[t]he
probability of incompatibility with the applicable laws of other
countries is so obvious that if Congress intended such foreign
application ‘it would have addressed the subject of conflicts with
foreign laws and procedures.’”141 Congress swiftly answered this
call with Title IX of the Dodd-Frank Act.142
Title IX contains section 929P(b), an “eleventh-hour”
provision, which—though “hastily drafted and subject to much
criticism”—expressed Congress’s clear intention that “the validity
of securities fraud actions brought by the U.S. government would
continue to be measured by the conduct and effects tests rather
than the transactional test.”143 Notwithstanding the ensuing
debate that took place as to whether the language and context of
section 929P(b) was merely a jurisdictional matter, courts have
generally agreed that publicly raised securities actions (e.g.,
SEC actions) are now examined under the conduct and effects
test, in spite of Morrison.144 According to the SEC, its authority
to bring securities actions will best foster confidence in the U.S.
securities market.145
2. Encouraging Exodus: The SEC’s Definition of a
U.S. Person
The August Publication focuses on Title VII’s definitions of
“security-based swap dealer”146 and “major security-based swap
participant”147 in the cross-border context, with a minimum
threshold analysis related to those definitions.148 Entities falling
under those definitions are subject to increased regulation of their
swap dealing activities and the accompanying expense of creating
141 Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 269 (2010) (citing EEOC
v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 256 (1991)).
142 See supra Section I.D.
143 He, supra note 64, at 166.
144 See, e.g., U.S. SEC v. Chi. Convention Ctr., LLC, 961 F. Supp. 2d 905, 913
(N.D. Ill. 2013) (“Interpreting Section 929P(b) as jurisdictional, rather than as a partial
refutation of Morrison, may, therefore, run contrary to a cardinal principle of statutory
construction to avoid superfluous portions of statutes.”).
145 The August Publication, supra note 21, at 47,361.
146 15 U.S.C.A. § 78c(a)(71) (2012).
147 Id. at § 78c(a)(67).
148 The August Publication, supra note 21, at 47,278.
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systems to ensure compliance with those regulations—with one
exception: “‘security-based swap dealer’ entities that engage in a
‘de minimis’ quantity of security-based swap dealing activity with
or on behalf of customers.”149 A person can take advantage of the
de minimis exception if their “[security-based swap] dealing
activity over the preceding 12 months does not exceed a gross
notional amount of $3 billion, subject to a phase-in level of $8
billion.”150 Thus, if an entity can exempt its swap dealing under
the de minimis limit, it will avoid the cost of compliance that
accompanies increased regulatory requirements.151
In the cross-border context, “U.S. persons [must] apply all
of their dealing transactions against the de minimis threshold[ ] ,
including activity they conduct through their foreign branches.”152
On the other hand, non-U.S. persons are held to a more lenient
standard that requires them to count fewer types of transactions
against their de minimis calculations.153 Consequently,
compliance with the August Publication hinges on the definition
of a U.S. person. After considering comments provided by other
regulatory entities and market participants,154 the SEC defined a
U.S. person as
[A] Any natural person resident in the United States; [B] Any
partnership, corporation, trust, investment vehicle, or other legal
person organized, incorporated, or established under the laws of the
United States or having its principal place of business in the United
States; [C] Any account (whether discretionary or non-discretionary)
of a U.S. person; or [D] Any estate of a decedent who was a resident
of the United States at the time of death.155

Crucially, this definition does not recognize a foreign subsidiary
of a U.S. company as a U.S. person “merely by virtue of its
Id. at 47,301.
Id. at 47,301.
151 The cost of regulatory compliance is often significant enough to dictate some
corporate decisions. “Dodd-Frank regulation and the G20 Commitments effectively
require market participants to completely change how they trade, settle, and clear OTC
derivatives, demanding large amounts of additional margin, new relationships,
documentation, and business practices. Many view the regulations as burdensome, costly,
and excessive.” Johnson, supra note 26, at 544; see also infra Section III.C (discussing the
G20 commitments).
152 The August Publication, supra note 21, at 47,302.
153 Id. at 47,301.
154 See Comments on Cross-Border Security-Based Swap Activities; Re-Proposal
of Regulation SBSR and Certain Rules and Forms Relating to the Registration of
Security-Based Swap Dealers and Major Security-Based Swap Participants, U.S.
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-02-13/
s70213.shtml [http://perma.cc/REV6-WJHB] [hereinafter August Publication Comments]
(last visited Nov. 30, 2015).
155 The August Publication, supra note 21, at 47,306.
149
150
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relationship with its U.S. parent.”156 Neither does “a foreign
person with a U.S. subsidiary . . . [become] a U.S. person simply
by virtue of its relationship with its U.S. subsidiary.”157
Ultimately, “[u]nder the final definition, the status of a legal
person as a U.S. person has no bearing on whether separately
incorporated or organized legal persons in its affiliated corporate
group are U.S. persons.”158 Therefore, the de minimis benchmark
that is applied to U.S. persons is not automatically applied to
subsidiaries and affiliates of U.S. persons. The result is a
detrimental economic impact on the U.S. swap market, as well
as an impediment to quelling global systemic risk.
3. The August Publication’s Failure to Adequately
Manage Risk and Support the U.S. Swap Market
The August Publication’s attempt to add guidance to the
use of cross-border security-based swap activities was a laudable
and necessary undertaking in the wake of Dodd-Frank’s
financial industry reforms. But it has flaws. At the forefront of
the issues generated by the August Publication is its overt
willingness to create and maintain a loophole that allows
security-based swap dealers to skirt the new regulations.
Indeed, perhaps the best “guidance” the August Publication has
provided to U.S. investors is to avoid domestic markets for any
security-based swap transactions.
The glaring loophole—although in light of the SEC’s
recognition and acceptance of it, it is perhaps best described as
an acquiescence—of the August Publication is its definition of a
U.S. person. Prior to adopting the August Publication—and
within it, the final definition of a U.S. person—the SEC
released a proposed set of rules in May 2013 (May 2013
proposal).159 The May 2013 proposal allowed the SEC to accept
comments from other regulators, investors, and legal
professionals in order to gauge the industry’s response to the
SEC’s application of Dodd-Frank Title VII definitions in the
cross-border context.160 The Commission received 36 comments

Id. at 47,308.
Id.
158 Id.
159 Cross-Border Security-Based Swap Activities; Re-Proposal of Regulation
SBSR and Certain Rules and Forms Relating to the Registration of Security-Based
Swap Dealers and Major Security-Based Swap Participants, Exchange Act Release No.
69490, 78 Fed. Reg. 30,968 (May 23, 2013) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. 240, 242, 249).
160 August Publication Comments, supra note 154.
156
157
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in total, the majority of which addressed, at least partially, the
definitions that were the focus of the August Publication.161
Many commenters’ concerns specifically focused on the
definition of a U.S. person. Their reasons for concern were
twofold. The first was that the definition was likely to have an
adverse impact on the way companies raise capital, as well as
on the efficiency and competition of the domestic U.S. market
for security-based swaps.162 The second cause for concern arose
from the disunity between the May 2013 proposal and other
global efforts to regulate security-based swaps; this has opened
the door for system-wide, risk-fostering regulatory arbitrage.163
i.

Adverse Economic Impact on the U.S. SecurityBased Swap Market

The SEC asserted in the August Publication that its
decision to designate foreign branches of U.S. banks—but not
separately capitalized foreign subsidiaries—as U.S. persons for
purposes of de minimis calculations reflects the notion that
“major security-based swap participant calculation thresholds
[should] include the positions of such persons that are most
likely to cause risk to the U.S. financial system at the threshold
levels set in the major security-based swap participant
definition.”164 This inequitable treatment creates a likelihood,
acknowledged by the SEC, that competition in the U.S.
security-based swap market will weaken investment and drive
it into foreign jurisdictions.165
Namely, non-U.S. persons will be reluctant to engage in
security-based swaps with U.S.-based counterparties. Because
non-U.S. persons will trigger the application of additional
requirements when their transactions with U.S. persons rise
161 The August Publication, supra note 21, at 47,281. A number of commenters
also addressed aspects of the proposal that are outside the scope of this release, and a
few of those commenters only addressed issues that were outside the scope of this
release (for example, addressing only proposed Regulation SBSR). “We will consider
those comments in connection with the relevant rulemakings.” Id. at 47,281 n.24.
162 See, e.g., Americans for Financial Reform, Comment Letter on CrossBorder Security Based Swaps Activities 4-8 (Aug. 22, 2013), http://www.sec.gov/
comments/s7-02-13/s70213-54.pdf [http://perma.cc/84M9-RPV9].
163 See, e.g., BETTER MARKETS, RE: CROSS-BORDER SECURITY-BASED SWAP
ACTIVITIES; RE-PROPOSAL OF REGULATION SBSR AND CERTAIN RULE AND FORMS
RELATING TO THE REGISTRATION OF SECURITY-BASED SWAP DEALERS AND MAJOR
SECURITY-BASED SWAP PARTICIPANTS (RELEASE NO. 34-69490; FILE NOS. S7-02-13; S734-10; S7-40-11) 9, 14-15 (Aug. 22, 2013), http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-0213/s70213-42.pdf [http://perma.cc/TUC3-65UG].
164 The August Publication, supra note 21, at 47,355.
165 Id. at 47,361-62.
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above the de minimis level, the incentive for non-U.S. persons is
to avoid the cost of compliance by dealing with other non-U.S.
persons. Conclusively, the August Publication notes, “Indeed,
some entities may determine that the compliance costs arising
from the requirements of Title VII warrant exiting the securitybased swap market in the United States entirely.”166
The significance of the economic impact aside, a
potentially graver risk arises from the notion that U.S. entities
might externalize the cost of regulatory compliance by creating
“separately-capitalized foreign subsidiaries to conduct their
security-based swap operations.”167 Should entities that are
currently engaged in domestic swap transactions follow this
hypothesis and exit the U.S. security-based swap market, the
liquidity of such swaps will be greatly reduced.168 This will lead
to higher price spreads and higher barriers to entry (based on
the already concentrated nature of dealing activity),169 thereby
impeding the entry of new security-based swap participants
who could “compete away spreads.”170
The eventual manifestation of this hypothesis requires
little speculation. Corporations and governments have
historically been drawn to deregulated environments where
they can gain a competitive edge and attract business; this
trend is known as the “race to the bottom.”171 At present, and in
a similar context, widespread corporate inversions are creating
a race to the bottom between U.S. companies seeking favorable
tax treatment. While the intricacies of these inversions are
beyond the scope of this note, they are in essence a means for a
corporation to change the jurisdiction in which it is
domiciled.172 Using inversions, a number of U.S. companies,
including Burger King, Pfizer, Walgreens, and Medtronic, have
Id. at 47,362.
Id.
168 “Liquidity” refers to “[t]he ability to convert an asset to cash quickly.”
Root, Liquidity, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/l/liquidity.asp
[http://perma.cc/AWR3-6VZU] (last visited Nov. 30, 2015).
169 The August Publication, supra note 21, at 47,362.
170 Id.
171 See Financial Regulatory Reform: The International Context: Hearing
Before the Comm. on Fin. Servs., 112th Cong. 12 (2011) (statement of Lael Brainard,
Under Sec’y for Int’l Affairs) (“The risk of regulatory arbitrage carries real impacts. It
means a race to the bottom for standards and protections. It means the potential loss of
jobs in the American financial sector if firms move overseas.”).
172 A corporation “inverts” when it acquires a related foreign company so that it
may domicile its headquarters in a foreign jurisdiction, thereby avoiding the regulations and
taxes of the domestic one. See Brent Radcliffe, Corporate Inversion, INVESTOPEDIA,
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/c/corporateinversion.asp [http://perma.cc/HDT4-8Z5N]
(last visited Nov. 30, 2015).
166
167
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changed or considered changing their legally recognized
headquarters to avoid the U.S. corporate tax rate.173 This
anecdotal evidence bears a strong resemblance to the issues of
competition discussed in the August Publication and serves as
a warning that, given the opportunity to operate in deregulated
jurisdictions, companies (in the case of security-based swaps,
U.S. banks and other investors) will abandon domestic
transactions in favor of more competitive foreign operations.
It should be noted, as the SEC is quick to highlight, that
there may be competitive benefits associated with the August
Publication’s definition of a U.S. person.174 The SEC emphasized
that the August Publication’s rules and guidance might “allow
registered dealers to credibly signal high quality, better risk
management, and better counterparty protection relative to
foreign unregistered dealers that compete for the same order
flow.”175 There is some truth to this, as more risk-averse
investors (i.e., pension funds and municipalities) may gravitate
toward the more transparent and “high-quality” market. To the
extent that entities engaged in U.S. security-based swaps have
not already left the domestic market, however, it is unlikely
that enough of a surge of interest in U.S. markets will occur to
entice dealers to conduct their security-based swap activities
within the United States.
ii.

Regulatory Arbitrage

Commenters on the May 2013 Proposal also voiced
concerns about the differing approaches to regulating swaps
taken by the SEC and CFTC. These comments emphasized the
diverging definitions of “U.S. person” adopted by each entity.
This divergence, according to some commenters, creates a risk
of regulatory arbitrage that will lead to inefficiencies in the
domestic U.S. financial system and hamper efforts to minimize
173 See Peter Loftus, Pfizer Hasn’t Ruled Out Potential Inversions, Chief Says,
WALL ST. J. (Oct. 28, 2014, 11:59 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/pfizer-narrowsoutlook-as-results-top-estimates-1414495030
[http://perma.cc/S5U9-JFZB];
John
D.
McKinnon & Damien Paletta, Burger King-Tim Hortons Merger Raises Tax-Inversion
Issue, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 25, 2014, 7:40 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/burger-king-timhortons-merger-plan-raises-tax-inversion-issue-1409010049 [http://perma.cc/6WAK-E7SS];
Paul Ziobro, Walgreen Weighs Riding Tax-Inversion Wave, WALL ST. J. (July 15,
2014, 7:21 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/walgreen-weighs-riding-tax-inversion-wave1405453698 [http://perma.cc/EBG3-Z2FE]; Medtronics’s Tax Inversion Lesson, WALL ST. J.
(Aug. 13, 2014, 8:45 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/medtronics-tax-lesson-1407883241
[http://perma.cc/XE3W-BXCB].
174 The August Publication, supra note 21, at 47,362.
175 Id.
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systemic risk.176 The larger threat, however, comes from the
parallel hazard that may result from regulatory arbitrage on a
global scale.
Arbitrage is defined as “the simultaneous buying and
selling of identical securities in different markets, with the
hope of profiting from the price difference between those
markets.”177 In its most commonly associated context of
purchasing and selling securities, arbitrage is essentially a
strategy to earn money based on differences in bid/ask prices
among sellers, rather than any actual change in the value of
the security. It is therefore a result of market inefficiencies,
since a security with a constant value should be worth the
same price to different purchasers.178
Regulatory arbitrage functions in a similar manner to
securities arbitrage, with the difference being that, instead of
seeking price differentials for securities, parties seek out
jurisdictions that have adopted reduced regulations in order to
win business from entities that operate in highly regulated
jurisdictions.179 The result is a dangerous slippery slope that
may lead “to a race to the bottom among regulatory authorities
and the ultimate failure to achieve the regulatory goal.”180
Critically, the heart of the “problem” of regulatory
arbitrage is that when a foreign regulatory scheme and a
domestic scheme do not protect against the same risks or do not
reach the same levels of protection, systemic risk remains
prevalent.181 That is not to say, however, that the existence of
two different regimes is necessarily a problem. Mere differences
between foreign and domestic policies, as long as they effectively
achieve the same goal, do not create regulatory arbitrage—or at
least, they do not create problematic regulatory arbitrage182—
since the ultimate objective is still reached in both
jurisdictions.183 The problem of regulatory arbitrage has been
accurately summed up as:
176 See, e.g., AMERICANS FOR FINANCIAL REFORM, RE: CROSS-BORDER SECURITY
BASED SWAPS ACTIVITIES; FILE NOS. S7-02-13; S7-34-10; S7-40-11 4-8 (Aug. 22, 2013),
http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-02-13/s70213-54.pdf [http://perma.cc/7HHF-ELAL].
177 Arbitrage, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
178 Root,
Arbitrage,
INVESTOPEDIA,
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/a/
arbitrage.asp [http://perma.cc/NCJ5-BVAS] (last visited Nov. 30, 2015).
179 Griffith, supra note 27, at 1293.
180 Id.
181 Id. at 1362.
182 See infra note 234 and accompanying text (explaining how arbitrage may
in some instances be beneficial).
183 Griffith, supra note 27, at 1327.
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A regulated entity’s movement of business from Jurisdiction A,
which has adopted efficient Regulatory Strategy X addressing
Problem Y, to Jurisdiction B, which has defected from efficient
Regulatory Strategy X (for reasons of moral hazard or agency costs
or other) and therefore fails to adequately address Problem Y and in
which it is therefore less costly to conduct business.184

While regulatory arbitrage is often thought of on a global
country-to-country scale, it can also arise between two domestic
agencies with similar regulatory scopes and mandates. As it did
the SEC, Title VII of Dodd-Frank also required the CFTC to
adopt a new regulatory regime governing the swaps that DoddFrank designated as within the CFTC’s ambit.185 The CFTC’s
final rules and guidance, released in July 2013, included a
definition of a U.S. person under which a company’s subsidiaries
are more likely to have their transactions counted toward the de
minimis threshold calculation than under the SEC’s scheme.186
This divergence prefigures a global hazard that jurisdictions with
unequal regulations will relocate—rather than eliminate—the
systemic risk that Dodd-Frank seeks to combat.
If foreign jurisdictions do not adopt schemes with
similar force and objectives as Dodd-Frank, then race-to-thebottom mechanics indicate that “Dodd-Frank may instead turn
the traditionally robust and innovative US OTC derivative
market into an island, where the only participants are those
that have no other options as to where and with whom they can
trade.”187 Furthermore, the alleged safety of the refined U.S.
markets “may be illusory if swap activity moves to unregulated
markets that may, in the long run, have a systemic effect on
the United States if such trading results in outsized losses.”188
In this sense, regulatory arbitrage will have the effect of
moving the origination of systemic risk from one location to
another without actually reducing the risk itself, thereby
preserving U.S.-based parties’ exposure to the dangers thought
to be allayed by Dodd-Frank.

Id.
See supra Section I.D. While the SEC regulates security-based swaps, the
CFTC governs interest rate swaps, commodity-based swaps, and currency swaps,
among other derivatives. OFFICE OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING
COMMISSION, Q & A—FINAL RULES AND INTERPRETATIONS 1, http://www.cftc.gov/ucm/
groups/public/@newsroom/documents/file/fd_qa_final.pdf [http://perma.cc/6X33-C75J]
(last visited Nov. 30, 2015).
186 See Griffith, supra note 27, at 1332-33.
187 Johnson, supra note 26, at 543.
188 Id.
184
185
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The Tolls on the Private and Public Sectors Converge

Now the question is how the synthesis of the economic
reality test from Elliott, combined with the August
Publication’s definition of a U.S. person, will affect the viability
of U.S. security-based swaps. Under the current state of the
law, Elliott’s economic reality test dictates that U.S.-based
investors are not entitled to a private right of action to bring
claims of securities fraud when those investors transact in
security-based swaps with foreign-cubed characteristics. This
holds true even when the locations of both parties to the swap,
as well as the location of the transaction itself, are within the
United States, which contravenes the plain-letter intent of the
Supreme Court’s decision in Morrison.
Nevertheless, the inherent value and efficacy of securitybased swaps is in their unique ability to provide exposure to
foreign markets. The resulting bottom line is that U.S. investors,
unable to seek protection from securities fraud within their
domestic borders, are at risk of being targeted by foreign
perpetrators of securities fraud. As 42 law professors collectively
opined in a Morrison-prompted comment to the SEC, “[c]omity
does not require that the U.S. tolerate or protect fraudulent
conduct that emanates from or has significant effects within its
borders.”189 The reality is quite the opposite, for the “sake of
judicial clarity” cannot be seen as a superseding interest to “the
U.S. government’s responsibility to protect its citizens.”190
Meanwhile, in the public sector, the regulatory
environment has become equally hostile to equity swaps.
Indeed, Congress, through Dodd-Frank, reinstated the SEC’s
ability to bring public causes of action attacking securities
fraud under the familiar conduct and effects test. This offensive
capability notwithstanding, the definition of a U.S. person in
the August Publication will have the effect of removing most
security-based swap activity from U.S. markets and will thus
diminish opportunities for the more lenient standard to be
applied. While this standard may allow the SEC to pursue
foreign perpetrators of securities fraud more so than the
economic reality test would, it is by no means a catch-all
standard that will instill investors with confidence in the SEC’s
ability to protect transactions. When combined, the negative
189 Forty-Two Law Professors, Comments on Study on Extraterritorial Private
Rights of Action, SEC File No. 4-617, 10 (Feb. 18, 2011), http://www.sec.gov/comments/
4-617/4617-28.pdf [http://perma.cc/7DKJ-UYTA].
190 Corcoran, supra note 132, at 101.
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synergy of the economic reality test and the August Publication
creates an unfortunate reality: cross-border security-based
swaps in U.S. markets will lose their utility and become a less
attractive derivative.
The key to this inference is the focus on the location of
the swap transaction within the United States. Since their
inception, security-based swaps have skyrocketed in global
popularity and continue to do so today.191 Their structure is too
unique and provides too many benefits for investors to
completely abandon them if they hope to stay competitive in
today’s financial universe. It is not the global popularity of the
derivative itself, however, that is waning—it is the popularity
of security-based swaps conducted by parties within the United
States. In light of the economic reality test’s litigationdismissive stance on security-based swaps, the cost of
compliance with Dodd-Frank’s rules and the August
Publication’s subsidiary exemption offer no incentive for
conducting security-based swaps within the United States. An
investor in cross-border security-based swaps who is located in
the United States—and who, as a result of the economic reality
test, would likely not be able to bring a claim of securities fraud
in the United States anyway—would be better served by
transacting her swaps through a foreign party in a jurisdiction
where she may be able to retain the benefits of a more opaque
market and where the transaction costs will be lower.192
The end result will be a U.S. market that begins to lose
its internationally competitive edge. As investors move their
transactions abroad, large banks and other facilities that
conduct security-based swaps will similarly flock to
deregulated foreign markets and become arbitrageurs in a
regulatory race to the bottom. The ensuing loss of investment
will damage the U.S. economy just as it begins to regain
stability after the 2007–2008 financial crisis.
On the one hand, the predilection towards exhaustive
regulation and transparency demanded by Dodd-Frank and
championed by the August Publication was intended to avoid a
crisis similar to that of 2007–2008.193 To that end, the synergy
of the economic reality test and the August Publication will

See supra Section I.C.
See supra Section II.B.3.
193 See CHATHAM FIN., supra note 20, at 1 (explaining the objectives of Title
VII of Dodd-Frank).
191

192
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indeed be a significant force in preventing fraud from occurring
within the United States with respect to security-based swaps.
On the other hand, the fraud that will now no longer
occur within the United States is better thought of as simply
being displaced, rather than extinguished. Parties to these
transactions are still exposed to fraud—it simply emanates
from another market. Furthermore, U.S. parties who conduct
security-based swaps in foreign jurisdictions and are defrauded
will be economically harmed just the same as if they were
defrauded in the United States. It is therefore clear that the
current efforts to regulate and litigate cross-border securitybased swaps cannot suffice as the definitive regime. The
horizon for these derivatives needs to be changed, and the $881
billion194 question is: how?
III.

FIXING THE U.S. MARKET FOR SECURITY-BASED SWAPS
WHILE STRENGTHENING THE REGULATORY HORIZON

There are two potential alterations to the United States’
current regulatory environment, which—combined with global
cooperation—could strengthen the U.S. market for securitybased swaps. The first possible domestic reform involves the
way in which cross-border security-based swaps are structured.
Such a remedy would require investors to modify their crossborder security-based swaps to avoid falling under the purview
of the economic reality test. While these modifications could
create swaps that would entitle investors to private recourse
for securities fraud, they would do so at the expense of
restraining investors’ ability to freely invest in a manner of
their choosing. Therefore, such modifications should not be
viewed as a viable means of attracting investment.
The second and more effective domestic change would
be to the newly issued judicial standards that govern these
derivatives and that discourage investors from utilizing U.S.
markets. In the case of cross-border security-based swaps,
changing the standard that governs transactions, rather than
the characteristics of the transaction itself, is a superior
remedy for a number of reasons. Chiefly, the bulk of the value
of security-based swaps comes from their structure, which
allows them to provide otherwise inaccessible exposure to the
returns on foreign equities and indices. Officially eliminating
the economic reality test would uphold the language and intent
194

BIS DERIVATIVES STATISTICS, tbl. 22B, supra note 66.
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of Morrison and, because of the “necessary versus sufficient”
analysis in Parkcentral, would still give deference to the
presumption against extraterritoriality.
It must be noted, however, that these two solutions share
one flaw—neither deals with deterring the cost of compliance and
the regulatory arbitrage created by Dodd-Frank. There is no
judicial remedy that could stem the race to the bottom absent
some exceedingly creative modification to the anatomy of
security-based swaps. This modification would need to transform
the swap into a novel instrument to which Dodd-Frank does not
apply195 and therefore does not subject purchasers to the cost of
complying with Dodd-Frank. The reforms to be made in this
regard depend upon a global effort to establish some form of
standardization for trading OTC derivatives in order to level the
playing field between international regulatory schemes and stem
the race to the bottom.
A.

Drawbacks to Altering the Structure of Security-Based
Swaps

One answer to denying a private right of action to U.S.
parties in cross-border security-based swaps is to alter the
structure of the swaps so that they do not appear to be
“transactions conducted upon foreign exchanges and
markets.”196 The swaps in Elliott occurred, as many securitybased swaps do, with strong ties to a foreign jurisdiction: the
referenced security was of a German company (VW); the shares
were not traded on U.S. exchanges; and the defendant Porsche
was a German company.197 So to comply with Elliott, some facet of
the agreement must change so that it no longer represents the
economic reality of a nondomestic transaction.
Presumably, the underlying equity must remain that of
a foreign company to create the beneficial hedging and market
access opportunities that are the driving forces behind securitybased swaps.198 Furthermore, as was the case in Elliott, U.S.
investors cannot always control the foreignness of the entities
that may attempt to defraud them, nor can U.S. investors
hand-pick the defendants that have ties to the United States.
The likes of which fall beyond the scope of this note.
Elliott Assocs. v. Porsche Auto. Holding SE, 759 F. Supp. 2d 469, 476
(S.D.N.Y. 2010), aff’d sub nom. Parkcentral Glob. Hub Ltd. v. Porsche Auto. Holdings
SE, 763 F.3d 198 (2d Cir. 2014).
197 Id.
198 CHANCE, supra note 48, at 68.
195

196

2015]

A DERIVATIVE IN NEED

397

That leaves the possibility of altering the underlying
referenced stock in order to create security-based swaps that
square with Elliott’s economic reality test.
Referencing ADRs instead of foreign shares of stock could
possibly create a security-based swap that comports with the
economic reality test. ADRs are certificates issued by U.S. banks
and represent a share of a foreign company.199 ADRs are similar
to the stock of a U.S. company;200 they can be traded on a U.S.
exchange or OTC market201 and must be registered with the
SEC.202 They differ in that “[a]n ADR may represent the
underlying shares on a one-for-one basis, or may represent a
fraction of a share or multiple shares . . . . The use of a ratio
allows ADRs to be priced at an amount more typical of U.S.
market share prices.”203 This means that ADRs have stronger ties
to the domestic U.S. market than do the shares of foreign
companies listed on foreign exchanges. Therefore, a swap
transaction that references an ADR as opposed to the actual
foreign shares of a non-U.S. company has the potential to pass the
economic reality test. Plaintiffs who show that they intentionally
tied a swap to an ADR and who conduct the transaction in the
U.S. will be better able to argue that the economic reality of the
agreement was to establish a domestic transaction.
Still, the ADR solution is far from perfect. First and
foremost, it confines investors to referencing a limited number
of foreign companies because many companies do not issue any
ADRs.204 This diminishes the hedging and exposure-providing
functions of security-based swaps. The remedy’s bigger flaw,
however, is a legal hurdle. In April 2012, the SEC released the
“Study on the Cross-Border Scope of the Private Right of Action
Under section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934”
(PRA Study), which gauged the ability of nongovernmental
investors to bring suit under section 10(b) under both past and

199 OFFICE OF INVESTOR EDUCATION AND ADVOCACY, U.S. SECS. AND EXCH. COMM’N,
INVESTOR BULLETIN: AMERICAN DEPOSITORY RECEIPTS 1 (2012), http://www.sec.gov/
investor/alerts/adr-bulletin.pdf [http://perma.cc/9ATL-HMP4] [hereinafter ADR Report].
They may also represent a percentage of a share, a single share, or multiple shares of a
foreign company. Id.
200 Id.
201 Id.
202 Id. at 2.
203 Id. at 1.
204 See SEC STAFF, U.S. SECS. AND EXCH. COMM’N, STUDY ON THE CROSSBORDER SCOPE OF THE PRIVATE RIGHT OF ACTION UNDER SECTION 10(B) OF THE
SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934, at 45 (Apr. 2012), http://www.sec.gov/news/
studies/2012/929y-study-cross-border-private-rights.pdf [http://perma.cc/X2C2-9DH2].
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present legal standards.205 In one section, the PRA Study
concluded that, with respect to whether section 10(b) covers
purchases and sales of ADRs, transactions will only pass
Morrison’s transactional test sometimes.206 Specifically, the
report summarized that while courts have found that
transactions involving ADRs fall within the scope of Morrison’s
first prong when they are conducted on domestic securities
exchanges,207 the District Court for the Southern District of
New York did not extend the same acceptance to ADR
transactions in the OTC market.208
The Société Générale court’s refusal to find that OTCADR transactions satisfy Morrison’s first prong is especially
detrimental to the ADR-tied swap solution. Not only are
investors who seek to reference ADRs in their security-based
swaps limited by the number of available companies that issue
ADRs, they are also limited to the much smaller subset of
companies whose ADRs trade on U.S. exchanges rather than in
the OTC market. These constraints significantly weaken the
value of a solution that is based on altering the actual
structure of security-based swaps.
B.

Advantages of Eliminating the Economic Reality Test

A second and more effective method of making the
United States more attractive to security-based swap investors
would be to increase the ability of those investors to bring
private securities fraud actions under section 10(b) by
eliminating Elliott’s economic reality test. Since the economic
reality test is already inconsistent with the language of
Morrison, abandoning it would maintain consistency and
demystify the transactional test without forcing investors to
restructure their investments. This could all be done without
abandoning the central tenet of the Supreme Court’s decision in
Morrison: the presumption against extraterritoriality.209 As the
Court explained, “the focus of the Exchange Act is not upon the
place where the deception originated, but upon purchases and
sales of securities in the United States.”210 Thus, Elliott’s
205 See generally id. (examining investors’ ability to bring claims of securities
fraud in the wake of Morrison and section 929P(b)(2) of Title IX of Dodd-Frank).
206 Id. at 30-31.
207 Id. at 30 n.110.
208 In re Société Générale Sec. Litig., No. 08-cv-2495, 2010 WL 3910286, at *67 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2010).
209 Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 248 (2010).
210 Id. at 266.
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“functional equivalent” gloss is at odds with Morrison on a
fundamental level; Elliott’s focus is not on geographic location,
but on the location of the economic impact of a transaction.211
Repealing the test would therefore help eliminate
inconsistencies in the judiciary’s approach to securities fraud.
Admittedly, the Elliott court was spurred by a legitimate
concern when it created the economic reality test in the first
place. The court expressed a particular aversion to creating a rule
that would “interfere with foreign securities regulation.”212
Abandoning the economic reality test, however, would better allay
this concern for three reasons. First, eliminating the test would
not automatically and unduly subject wholly foreign parties to
U.S. courts due to the “necessary versus sufficient” analysis
conducted in Parkcentral, which upholds the presumption against
extraterritoriality on its own.213 By repealing the economic reality
test, private investors, such as those in Elliott, would not be
barred from bringing suit simply because their swaps, while
based entirely domestically in some cases,214 resembled short sales
on foreign exchanges.215 These plaintiffs would clear Morrison’s
geographic hurdle and then be given an opportunity to establish
that the facts of their transaction entitle them to domestic
recourse in accordance with the Parkcentral case-by-case review.
Furthermore, plaintiffs like those in Parkcentral who were
allegedly harmed by fraud that was not perpetrated in the United
States216 and could not show a stronger connection to the United
States would still be barred from bringing suit, thus preserving
the presumption against extraterritoriality. Essentially, repealing
the economic reality test would give nongovernmental investors a
fighting chance to establish that the location of their transaction,
combined with the facts of the alleged fraud, is sufficient to invoke
domestic securities laws.
A second reason to abandon the economic reality test is
that potential regulatory conflicts should not force the United
States “to forgo its own objectives for the sake of harmony.”217 At
See supra notes 129-30.
Elliott Assocs. v. Porsche Auto. Holding SE, 759 F. Supp. 2d 469, 476
(S.D.N.Y. 2010), aff’d sub nom. Parkcentral Glob. Hub Ltd. v. Porsche Auto. Holdings
SE, 763 F.3d 198 (2d Cir. 2014).
213 Parkcentral Glob. Hub Ltd. v. Porsche Auto. Holdings SE, 763 F.3d 198,
214 (2d Cir. 2014).
214 See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
215 Elliott Assocs., 759 F. Supp. 2d at 476.
216 Parkcentral, 763 F.3d at 207 (“Porsche’s allegedly deceptive conduct
occurred primarily in Germany . . . .”).
217 Corcoran, supra note 132, at 103.
211
212
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the outset, it is clear that cross-border transactions in this context
could possibly implicate the regulatory interests of both states;218
repealing Elliott’s standard while preserving Parkcentral’s opens
the door for U.S. participants in cross-border security-based
swaps to seek domestic recourse and therefore deters foreign
perpetrators of securities fraud from actively targeting U.S.
investors. Conversely, what is not clear is whether the application
of section 10(b) with a Parkcentral gloss would create a conflict in
the first place, potentially obviating the presumption against
extraterritoriality completely. The Supreme Court has held that
with respect to international comity, no conflict of laws exists
“where a person subject to regulation by two states can comply
with the laws of both.”219 Instead, comity is only implicated when
there is a true, direct conflict between U.S. laws and those of a
foreign state.220 Although U.S. securities laws are generally
expansive and require that companies make added disclosures,221
“a true conflict with foreign law would only be implicated
if . . . the laws of other nations expressly prohibit certain
mandated disclosures.”222 Repealing the economic reality test
would therefore have no discernable negative influence on the
presumption against extraterritoriality.
The third and final reason to repeal the economic reality
test is that affording U.S. investors a chance to bring private
suits would supplement the SEC’s attempts to prevent
securities fraud in light of its limited resources.223 SEC
Commissioner Luis Aguilar, in a lengthy dissent to the PRA
Study, opined that
[t]he truth of the matter is that the SEC, does not, and will not, ever
have enough resources to investigate all of the fraud cases that
exist . . . . In fact, even if the SEC exercises its discretion to bring a
case, rarely are investors made whole . . . . In light of the limited

Id.
Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 799 (1993) (citing
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 403, cmt. e).
220 Id.
221 See generally Tanja Boskovic et al., Comparing European and U.S. Securities
Regulations: MiFID Versus Corresponding U.S. Regulations 33-34 (World Bank, Working
Paper No. 184, 2009), http://siteresources.worldbank.org/ECAEXT/Resources/2585981256842123621/6525333-1263245503321/European_US_SecuritiesRegulations.pdf
[http://perma.cc/4AT9-Q62Y] (discussing the similarities and differences between U.S.
and European securities regulations).
222 Corcoran, supra note 132, at 102.
223 Id. at 103.
218
219
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resources available to the SEC, private enforcement of the federal
securities laws is a necessary tool to combat securities fraud.224

Repealing the economic reality test while preserving the
Parkcentral analysis will therefore give deference to the
presumption against extraterritoriality, deter foreign perpetrators
of fraud from targeting U.S. investors, and supplement the SEC’s
efforts to pursue securities fraud, all while preserving the
structure, and by extension the value, of cross-border securitybased swaps.
C.

Global Regulatory Coordination

For all the benefits of repealing the economic reality
test, one issue that remains unresolved is the regulatory
arbitrage that would result from investors seeking to avoid the
cost of compliance with Dodd-Frank. Reconfiguring the U.S.
environment for security-based swaps is therefore incomplete.
While the renewed possibility of bringing private suits may
attract U.S. investors back to the domestic market, the race to
the bottom will still compel them to conduct security-based
swaps in deregulated jurisdictions abroad, thereby preserving
the systemic risks that Dodd-Frank seeks to eliminate. This
necessarily implicates a coordinated response that goes beyond
international borders. To remedy the push and pull of an
increased compliance mandate, the “bottom” to which investors
race must be rebalanced through similar compliance programs,
so that all jurisdictions are equally secure and the cost of
compliance is homogenized across jurisdictions.
After the 2007–2008 financial crisis, financial
policymakers in some of the world’s largest economies sought to
coordinate OTC markets through the G-20.225 This group
represents “85 per cent of the world economy, 76 per cent of global
trade, and two-thirds of the world’s population, including more
than half of the world’s poor.”226 At a series of meetings beginning
in 2008, the G-20 concluded, among other things, that “[a]ll
standardized OTC derivative contracts should be traded on
exchanges or electronic trading platforms . . . and cleared through
224 Luis A. Aguilar, Statement by Commissioner: Defrauded Investors Deserve Their
Day in Court, U.S. SECS. AND EXCH. COMM’N 4 (Apr. 11, 2012), http://www.sec.gov/News/
PublicStmt/Detail/PublicStmt/1365171490204#.VL6WX0fF-Sp [http://perma.cc/635J-89DG].
225 The G-20 is comprised of 19 countries and the European Union. The G20,
AUSTL. GOV’T, http://www.dfat.gov.au/trade/g20/ [http://perma.cc/CEB5-N4DD] (last visited
Nov. 30, 2015).
226 Id.
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central counterparties.”227 Central counterparty clearing thus
became the cornerstone of the unified global response to
combating systemic risk in derivative transactions.228
There has been progress towards fully implementing the
unified response, though the extent of such progress is uncertain.
In its most recent report chronicling the global progress of OTC
derivatives market reforms, the Financial Stability Board (FSB),
an international body that seeks to promote financial stability by
coordinating national finance authorities,229 noted that “[m]arket
participants in general appear to be making good progress,” but
“regulatory uncertainty has held back the finalization of
preparations by some market participants.”230 This report was
issued by the FSB as part of its role to “monitor[ ] the progress of
the implementation of OTC derivative market reforms.”231
Similarly, the SEC and CFTC issued the “Joint Report on
International Swap Regulation,”232 in which the agencies
concluded that “[t]he G-20 leaders have agreed to the OTC
derivatives commitments, but it is still too early to determine
precisely where there is alignment internationally and where
there may be gaps or inconsistencies.”233 Thus, complete global
reform has not yet been realized.
Until global cooperation translates into global compliance
and standardized protections, the cost of compliance will not be
uniform, regulatory arbitrage will take place to the detriment of
the U.S. market as investors avoid the cost of compliance with
Dodd-Frank, and U.S. investors will still be exposed to the risks
that Dodd-Frank attempts to contain. It is quite possibly true
that in this context, a “uniform” global response does not
Griffith, supra note 27, at 1310.
For an explanation of central counterparty clearing, see id. at 1311-17. The
details of this regulatory strategy fall beyond the scope of this note. It is relevant, however,
as an example of a globally unified response to risk in OTC derivative markets.
229 For a further description of the FSB, see About the FSB, FIN. STABILITY
BOARD, http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/about/ [http://perma.cc/3J6S-YSA4] (last
visited Nov. 30, 2015).
230 FIN. STABILITY BD., OTC DERIVATIVES MARKET REFORMS: SIXTH PROGRESS
REPORT ON IMPLEMENTATION 1 (Sept. 2, 2013), http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/
publications/r_130902b.pdf [http://perma.cc/4B9S-8NR8].
231 Johnson, supra note 26, at 560.
232 COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM’N & U.S. SEC. EXCH. COMM’N, JOINT
REPORT ON INTERNATIONAL SWAP REGULATION 111 (2012), http://www.cftc.gov/ucm/
groups/public/@swaps/documents/file/dfstudy_isr_013112.pdf [http://perma.cc/Q6LV-6RSQ].
“Congress required the CFTC and the SEC to study the regulation of OTC derivatives
across the United States, Asia, and Europe in hopes of identifying areas of potential
regulatory arbitrage.” Johnson, supra note 26, at 562.
233 JOINT REPORT, supra note 232, at 111. One such “gap” was in the Brazilian
regulatory scheme, which does not mandate or plan to mandate clearing of OTC
derivatives. Griffith, supra note 27, at 1323 n.153.
227
228
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necessarily mandate that every nation adopt the same exact
rules but instead allows countries to mutually recognize one
another’s regulatory schemes so long as each scheme protects
against the same risks and to the same degree.234 But a uniform
objective must exist to some extent to prevent regulatory
arbitrage. Under Dodd-Frank, the cost of compliance with the
perceived-safe U.S. regime has increased above the cost of
compliance with competing jurisdictions and has thereby
encouraged investors to conduct swap transactions abroad. The
United States must therefore make a concerted and resolute
push towards achieving global implementation of the G-20
commitments by supporting the FSB as it persuades G-20
members to accept and honor their pledges to combat systemic
risk. The full and active support of the United States will
increase the FSB’s influence and the likelihood that
standardization will be achieved, which will in turn protect the
U.S. security-based swap market by leveling the regulatory
playing field and retaining investments in U.S. markets.
CONCLUSION
When the Elliott court created the economic reality test
in an effort to interpret Morrison, it mistakenly went beyond the
Supreme Court’s intention. Elliott’s “functional equivalent” gloss
is too deferential to the presumption against extraterritoriality
at the expense of U.S. investors who stand little chance of
meeting the test’s requirements in the context of cross-border
security-based swaps. Compounding matters, the Parkcentral
court, while developing a viable “necessary versus sufficient”
analysis in its own right, did not reject the economic reality test
and thereby left the door open for the test’s use in other cases.
Meanwhile, the SEC’s definition of a U.S. person under DoddFrank, in light of the still-fragmented system of global
234 In fact, some scholars see such uniformity as incredibly dangerous. As
Fordham Law School Professor Sean Griffith has stated:

Uniformity, by definition, means all jurisdictions regulate in the same way,
but if financial market crises have taught us anything, it is that regulators
often do not anticipate the next crisis. Thus, if all jurisdictions regulate in the
same way, and if, as has often been the case in the past, their chosen
regulatory approach fails to account for an emergent crisis, then world
financial markets will be more exposed to systemic risk than they might have
been had some jurisdictions regulated differently.
Griffith, supra note 27, at 1293-94. According to this view, regulatory arbitrage
between different regulatory regimes may be beneficial, so long as the regimes
effectively address and contain systemic risk in their own manner. Id.
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regulation, discourages investment in the U.S. OTC derivatives
market. Combined, these measures significantly weaken the
United States’ ability to attract investment in security-based
swaps at a time when those investments are vital to remaining
competitive in the global economy.
Reclaiming commercial strength in this area requires a
two-pronged approach. First, repealing the economic reality test
will render the U.S. swap market more attractive to securitybased swap investors by making domestic protection against
securities fraud a legitimate safeguard, rather than a remote
possibility. Second, achieving global implementation of some
degree of uniform regulation in OTC markets will safely reduce
systemic risk, normalize compliance costs, and eliminate the
economic disadvantage the United States suffers due to the
expense of complying with Dodd-Frank. Although past
performance may not necessarily indicate future results,235 the
historic growth of the security-based swap market may suggest
that it will continue expanding into a global force to be reckoned
with. Whether the United States will benefit as the preeminent
forum for transactions in these derivatives or simply become an
indistinguishable market without a competitive advantage
remains to be seen.
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